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COMBATING GANG-PERPETRATED WITNESS INTIMIDATION 
WITH FORFEITURE BY WRONGDOING 
By: Katie M. McDonough* 
 
“[T]he Constitution does not guarantee an accused person against the 
legitimate consequences of his own wrongful acts.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
Gangs are an extreme threat to the communities in which they 
operate and to the criminal justice system.2  Central to gang culture is 
strong loyalty among gang members coupled with “no snitching” 
policies enforced through intimidation and retaliation.3  Witnesses to 
crime, gang members who have knowledge of misdeeds, and even 
entire neighborhoods are fearful about cooperating with law 
enforcement in gang-controlled communities.4  The risk run by 
cooperating with law enforcement is real: many witnesses are attacked 
or killed, and residents in gang-controlled communities who report 
crimes to law enforcement face the prospect of retaliatory crimes 
against their person, property, and family members.5  Criminal gangs 
benefit from enforcing “no snitching” policies with intimidation and 
retribution.6  Successful witness intimidation or murder renders a 
witness unavailable, which means that the witness’s information is 
likely to be inadmissible in court.7  This often forces prosecutors to 
delay trial, reduce charges, or drop cases altogether, bringing the 
wheels of justice to a grinding halt.8  The common law doctrine of 
 
       * Katie M. McDonough, J.D., 2013, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 
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 1  Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158 (1878).  
 2  See Part I infra. 
 3  Id. 
 4  Id. 
 5  Id. 
 6  Id. 
 7  FED. R. EVID. 802 (restyled). 
 8  See infra note 100 and accompanying text. 
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“forfeiture by wrongdoing” provides a means to overcome the hurdle 
of an unavailable witness where the government can show that the 
defendant, by his own conduct, caused the unavailability of the 
witness and concurrently intended to silence him.9 
The prosecutor’s challenge is greater if the defendant is not the 
party who silenced the witness.  While a defendant is awaiting trial, 
especially if he is in jail, his fellow gang members may be able and 
willing to act on his behalf and carry out his gang’s “no snitching” 
policy by intimidating or harming adverse witnesses while avoiding 
contact with the defendant that might invite an inference of 
consultation.10  If a witness is silenced, her prior statements may be 
inadmissible and the defendant granted a windfall unless the 
prosecution can make the showing necessary to invoke forfeiture by 
wrongdoing.  To do so in federal court, the prosecution has to prove, 
at the very least, that the defendant “acquiesced” in the 
intimidation.11  If the statements of the absent declarant contain 
“testimonial” statements,12 the prosecution will have to take the extra 
 
 9  See generally Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008). 
 10  E.g., David Kocieniewski, With Witnesses at Risk, Murder Suspects Go Free, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 1, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/01 /nyregion
/01witness.html?pagewanted=all&_r=2& (describing how prolific witness 
intimidation in New Jersey turns “slam-dunk cases” into failed prosecutions, like the 
case of one particular gang member, who witnessed a murder but “quickly 
announced he would never testify for fear he would be ostracized for helping the 
police—or wind up murdered himself”) [hereinafter Witnesses At Risk]; see also, e.g., 
Urias v. Horel, No. CV 07-7155-JVS (RNB), 2008 WL 4363064, at *2–3 (C.D. Cal. 
Sept. 23, 2008) (civilian bystander to gang shooting was instructed not to attend 
court and then shot to death); David Kocieniewski, A Little Girl Shot, and a Crowd that 
Didn’t See, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/09/nyregion
/09taj.html?pagewanted=all (relating how the grandmother of a seven-year-old girl 
shot in the crossfire of a gang fight would not talk to the police for fear she would 
“have to move out of the country[,]” and that at least twenty other eyewitnesses 
remain unwilling to testify about this unsolved crime). 
 11  FED. R. EVID. 804(b) (6) (restyled). 
 12  In this Comment, the word “testimonial” is short-hand for “testimonial in the 
Crawford sense” to account a new definition employed by the Supreme Court since 
Crawford v. Washington.  541 U.S. 36 (2004).  In that case, the Court changed the 
usage of the phrase “testimonial statements” from “statements of fact or value” 
subject to an “assertion” requirement to a phrase meaning “statements made under 
circumstances objectively indicating some contemplation of later use at trial.”  
Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, Toward a Unified Theory of Testimonial Evidence Under 
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 1135, 1135 (2007) (attempting to 
harmonize the two usages).  For an example of the former usage, see, e.g., Schmerber 
v. California, which notes that Wigmore used the word “testimonial” to mean 
“communicative.”  384 U.S. 757, 774 (1966) (citing 8 WIGMORE 378) (McNaughton 
rev. 1961) (noting that Wigmore used the word “testimonial” to mean 
“communicative.”).  
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step of showing that the defendant had the purpose of silencing the 
declarant—i.e., had “specific intent”—a concept which, if too 
narrowly construed by courts, will allow the defendant to benefit 
from witness intimidation carried out by his peers as long as he did 
not specifically take part in or authorize the intimidation.13 
This Comment addresses the specific challenges of invoking 
forfeiture by wrongdoing against a gang member-defendant whose 
gang silences adverse witnesses on his behalf.  Part I establishes that 
gang culture inspires loyalty in its members, who willingly intimidate 
and silence witnesses in accordance with a gang’s “no snitching” 
policy.  It explains that gangs can subdue an entire community using 
terror, threats, and violence to ensure that citizens do not cooperate 
with the police, and it demonstrates that gangs’ “no snitching” 
policies, when enforced through intimidation and retaliation, hinder 
the criminal justice process.  Part II examines the jurisprudence 
surrounding the Confrontation Clause and forfeiture by wrongdoing.  
It asks whether, after Giles v. California, forfeiture by wrongdoing is 
applicable to instances of gang-perpetrated intimidation on behalf of 
(but without the specific knowledge of and direct participation by) 
the defendant.  This Comment argues that a gang member-defendant 
should forfeit his confrontation rights if he (1) joined or remained a 
member of a gang (2) with knowledge that the gang enforces a “no 
snitching” policy using intimidation or retaliation and (3) other gang 
members cause a witness’s unavailability in the defendant’s trial. This 
Comment ultimately concludes that these circumstances should 
satisfy the Giles “specific intent” requirement. 
I. LOST TESTIMONY: GANG-ENFORCED “NO SNITCHING” POLICIES 
SILENCE WITNESSES 
Organized street gangs are not new phenomena, and street-gang 
culture is not a contemporary invention.  Gang culture is found in 
many urban communities, new immigrant groups, and poverty-
stricken neighborhoods with few social controls.14  Poverty, 
heterogeneity of race or ethnicity (which gives rise to homogenous 
“subcultures”), and residential mobility, together, correlate with of a 
 
 13  See infra text accompanying note 152. 
 14  Jeffrey Fagan & Tracey L. Meares, Punishment, Deterrence, and Social Control: The 
Paradox of Punishment in Minority Communities, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 173, 189 (2008) 
(“[C]onditions of structural poverty strain a community’s ability to develop informal 
social controls.  Socially organized or cohesive communities are better able to engage 
in informal social control that can lead to lower levels of crime than communities 
that are not cohesive.”). 
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high degree of delinquency in a community15 and render a 
community ripe for the development of street gangs.  Frederic M. 
Thrasher, an early twentieth-century criminologist, described the 
development of gangs in this way: 
The gang is an interstitial group originally formed 
spontaneously, and then integrated through conflict.  It is 
characterized by the following types of behavior: meeting 
face to face, milling, movement through space as a unit, 
conflict, and planning.  The result of this collective 
behavior is the development of tradition, unreflective 
internal structure, esprit de corps, solidarity, morale, group 
awareness, and attachment to a local territory.16 
Gang members, even if organized informally, share experiences that 
foster loyalty and form them into a cohesive unit.17  A dramatic 1928 
chronicle of the rise of mid-nineteenth-century gangs in New York 
City explained that poverty, instability at home, lack of direction, and 
community disorganization fostered the development of gangsters in 
those urban slums.18  Even then, welfare agencies and religious 
leaders faced seemingly insurmountable challenges in combating the 
petty crime, violence, gambling, widespread alcohol abuse, starvation, 
and squalor among which the gangs proliferated.19 
Gangs manifest their own norms comprising unique rules and 
customs.20  Such culture is not new: gangs in the early nineteenth and 
 
 15  SOPHIE BODY-GENDROT, THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CITIES?: A COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVE 7 (2000) (referencing the observation of criminologists Shaw and McKay 
that it is difficult to free a neighborhood from these conditions). 
 16  FREDERIC M. THRASHER, THE GANG: A STUDY OF 1,313 GANGS IN CHICAGO 46 
(1927) (emphasis in original). 
 17  ALBERT K. COHEN, DELINQUENT BOYS: THE CULTURE OF THE GANG 13, 35 (The 
Free Press 1955).  Gangs share a “delinquent subculture” that “is itself a positive code 
with a definite if unconventional moral flavor.”  Id. 
 18  HERBERT ASBURY, THE GANGS OF NEW YORK xvi – xvii (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 
1928). 
 19  Id. at 15–16. 
 20  E.g., Ray Rivera, In Newburgh, Gangs and Violence Reign, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 
2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/12/nyregion/12newburgh.html?sq=gang%20cul
ture&st=nyt&adxnnl=1&scp=3&adxnnlx= 
1329195879-V9JrNbOnzk7fWHmncqs8CA&pagewanted=1 (describing growth of 
local street gangs in Newburgh, New York and referencing gang flags, clothing, and 
the concept of “respect”); Serge F. Kovaleski, Wanted: A Band of Men and Boys, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 15, 2007, 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B02E4D71539F936A2575BC0A96
19C8B63&scp=10&sq=gang%20culture&st=nyt&pagewanted=1 (describing the 
recruiting tactics of MS-13 in New Jersey, its origins as a Salvadoran gang, and its 
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early twentieth centuries possessed their own names, clothing styles, 
codes, reputations, and lore.21  The unique style and identifying 
characteristics of those early American street gangs lives on today in 
the gang colors, graffiti signs, and other symbols that contemporary 
street gangs have adopted.  Today, gang members are tattooed with 
gang identifiers, wear certain styles of dress adopted by their gang, 
and display gang insignia on jackets, hats, and pants.22  For instance, 
in southern California, Hispanic gangs often wear white tee shirts and 
a black or blue knit cap,23 while Blood and Crip sets24 dress 
individually but accessorize in gang colors (red and blue, 
respectively).25  Graffiti are utilized to mark gang turf, indicate gang 
status, make threats against a rival gang, or declare participation in a 
particular crime that was committed.26 
Gangs set themselves apart from the communities that they seek 
to control.27  A 1950s examination of delinquent youth gangs 
concluded that gang members recognize only the authority of their 
own leaders, have relations of intense solidarity with each other, and 
have “indifferent, hostile and rebellious” relations with non-gang 
members and authority figures.28  This view of the delinquent youth 
gang—articulated before the proliferation of guns and drugs that 
 
colors). 
 21  THRASHER, supra note 16, at 190–93; ASBURY, supra note 18, at 28.  For instance, 
in New York, the Daybreak Boys operated as an organized criminal enterprise 
committing heinous crimes on the riverfront, and the Molasses Gang would 
systematically rob stores and pick pockets.  Id. at 66.  The Dead Rabbits wore a red 
stripe on their pants, while the Plug Uglies, wearing plug hats, were feared for 
inflicting terrible violence on their victims with bludgeons and pistols.  Id. at 22. 
 22  Terror in Our Streets: A Special Report on Gang Violence in Southern California (Gang 
Characteristics), L.A. DAILY NEWS, Sept. 29, 2004, http://lang.dailynews.com
/socal/gangs/articles/dnp4_gcharacter.asp [hereinafter Gang Characteristics]. 
 23  Gang Characteristics, supra note 22. 
 24  Large gangs may be comprised of local sub-groups, or “sets,” which operate 
independently and may be in competition with neighboring sets of the gang.  See, 
e.g., NEW JERSEY DEPT. OF LAW AND PUBLIC SAFETY, DIVISION OF STATE POLICE, 
INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GANGS IN NEW JERSEY: MUNICIPAL LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE 
TO THE 2010 NJSP GANG SURVEY 12, available at http://www.njsp.org
/info/pdf/gangs_in_nj_2010.pdf. 
 25  Gang Characteristics, supra note 22. 
 26  Id. 
 27  Joseph Goldstein, 43 in Two Warring Gangs are Indicted in Brooklyn, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 19, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/20/nyregion/43-in-warring-
brooklyn-gangs-are-indicted.html?scp=1&sq=gang+culture+kelly+respect&st=nyt 
(quoting a Brooklyn district attorney’s statement that street gang members in 
Brooklyn “‘band together to control their turf, their block or their building, and 
terrorize those who fail to recognize their control and fail to pay them respect’”). 
 28  COHEN, supra note 17, at 30–31. 
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characterize street gangs today—reinforces the assertion that the 
fundamental characteristics of gangs remain unchanged.  Today, 
contemporary gang members set themselves apart by characterizing 
their activity as a war between themselves and other segments of 
society, even going as far as attacking rivals and police officers to 
develop fearsome reputations as forces with which to be reckoned.29  
Gang members act outside of the law and traditional norms of their 
own communities, actively seeking to intimidate residents and law 
enforcement in (often successful) attempts to establish control and 
instill fear.30 
While street gangs are not necessarily criminal,31 the gangs with 
which this Comment (and law enforcement) is concerned are those 
that engage in crime regularly.  Although each law-enforcement 
organization has its own definition of what constitutes a “gang,” 
nearly all list group criminality as the most important defining 
characteristic.32  Local street gangs may be driven by the desire to 
 
 29  Tracy Manzer, Terror in Our Streets: A Special Report on Gang Violence in Southern 
California (From His Own Words), L.A. DAILY NEWS, Sept. 27, 2004, 
http://lang.dailynews.com/socal/gangs/articles/lbp2_james.asp.  
 30  Beth Barrett, Terror in Our Streets: A Special Report on Gang Violence in Southern 
California (Gangster Menace), L.A. DAILY NEWS, Sept. 30, 2004, 
http://lang.dailynews.com/socal/gangs/articles/dnp5_main.asp [hereinafter 
Gangster Menace]. 
 31  For example, debates can be had over the dominantly criminal nature of some 
civil rights-era gangs.  E.g., James Alan McPherson, Chicago’s Blackstone Rangers (I), 
ATLANTIC MAGAZINE (May 1969) (detailing the often-violent history of Ranger Nation 
and the fact that it was “alternately praised and condemned by the national press, 
their community, the United States Senate, the local police, and Chicago youth 
organizations” such that “it is almost impossible to maintain a consistent opinion of 
the Blackstone Rangers”); Jennifer 8. Lee, The Young Lords Legacy of Puerto Rican 
Activism, N.Y. TIMES, City Room (Aug. 24, 2009, 11:07 a.m.), 
http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/24/ 
the-young-lords-legacy-of-puerto-rican-activism/ (describing the “confrontational 
tactics” of the short-lived New York chapter of the Young Lords, which successfully 
launched a “Garbage Offensive” to obtain municipal services for local residents). 
 32  National Youth Gang Survey Analysis: Defining Gangs and Designating Gang 
Membership, NAT’L GANG CTR., available at http://www.nationalgangcenter.gov/Survey-
Analysis/Defining-Gangs#anchordcog  (last visited Dec. 18, 2011).  There are six 
characteristics that are common to most definitions of “gang”: (1) whether the group 
engages in criminality; (2) whether leadership is present; (3) whether the group has 
a name; (4) whether it displays colors or symbols; (5) whether the group hangs out 
together; and (6) whether the group has a turf or territory.  Id.  “Gang” in the school 
setting may be defined as “a somewhat organized group, sometimes having turf 
concerns, symbols, special dress or colors. . . . [that has] a special interest in violence 
for status-providing purposes and is recognized as a gang by its members and by 
others,” or a group that “has a name and engages in fighting, stealing, or selling 
drugs.”  GARY D. GOTTFREDSON & DENISE C. GOTTFREDSON, GANG PROBLEMS AND GANG 
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control a neighborhood, such as the “Goodfellas,” “‘one of Central 
Harlem’s most violent and destructive street gangs,’” which allegedly 
obtained firearms for the purpose of intimidating rivals and keeping 
them off Goodfella turf.33  Gang activity is often conducted for 
reputational gain, both for the individual (as in the case of a Fairfax, 
Virginia man associated with a local MS-13 set, sentenced to life in 
prison for offering young girls “free of charge to full-fledged gang 
members to improve his own standing”34) and for the gang (as in the 
case of an officer shot purposely to demonstrate to a rival gang that 
the shooter’s gang was tough35).  Some gangs make group criminality 
their primary purpose.36  Large-scale organizations not only 
mastermind racketeering and narcotics trafficking for commercial 
gain, but “a slew of gangs, including the Bloods, Crips, Gangster 
Disciples, Vice Lords, and Latin Kings are branching out into 
mortgage fraud, identity theft, the manufacturing of counterfeit 
checks, and bank fraud.”37  Today, gangs are active in all fifty states 
and, in some communities, are responsible for up to eighty percent 
of crime.38  They are the main retail distributors of illegal drugs across 
 
PROGRAMS IN A NATIONAL SAMPLE OF SCHOOLS 4 (2001), available at 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/194607NCJRS.pdf. 
 33  Colin Moynihan, Prosecutors Target Gang in Harlem; 19 Charged, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
4, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/05/nyregion/19-arrested-as-prosecutors-
target-goodfellas-gang-in-harlem.html?_r=1 (quoting Manhattan District Attorney 
Cyrus R. Vance, Jr.).  
 34  Andrea McCarren, MS13 Street Gang and Others Tied to Child Prostitution, 9 NEWS 
NOW, Nov. 4, 2011, http://www.wusa9.com/news/article/173540/187/Feds-
Prosecute-Gang-Related-Child-Sex-Traffickers; see, e.g., Beth Barrett, Grieving Mothers: 
None Wounded More Deeply by Gang Violence, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 1, 2004, 
http://lang.dailynews.com/socal/gangs/printpage.asp?REF=/socal/gangs/articles/
dnp6_main.asp [hereinafter Grieving Mothers] (explaining that the murderer of Roy 
Brian Marino, an innocent teen, was motivated by the desire for “status” in a 
Pacioma, California gang). 
 35  David Kocieniewski, Gang Rivalry Cited in Police Captain’s Shooting, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 22, 1996, http://www.nytimes.com/1996/12/22/nyregion 
/gang-rivalry-cited-in-police-captain-s-shooting.html?ref=davidkocieniewski. 
 36  For a colorful example, see ASBURY, supra note 18, at 227–28 (describing gangs 
like the Whyos, a pre-Civil War New York City gang that committed crimes, including 
murder, mayhem, breaking bones, or even chewing off a victim’s ear, for money). 
 37  Loren Berlin, Street Gangs Clean Up on White Collar Crime, DAILY FIN., Oct. 28, 
2011,  http://www.dailyfinance.com/2011/10/28/street-gangs-new-dirty-
moneymaker-white-collar-crime/.  
 38  Key Findings: National Gang Threat Assessment 2009, NAT’L GANG INTEL. CTR. 
(Jan. 2009),at iii, http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/national-gang-
threat-assessment-2009-pdf.  There are nearly one million active gang members in 
the United States participating in the criminal activity of approximately 33,000 street 
gangs, motorcycle gangs, and prison gangs.  Gangs, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 
(Nov. 6, 2011), http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/vc_majorthefts/gangs
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the country and are increasingly involved in wholesale distribution.39  
Alien-smuggling, armed robbery, auto theft, extortion, identity theft, 
and murder are among gangs’ typical criminal activities today.40 
Gangs increase their power by defending their turf and fighting 
rivals.  Today’s much-publicized enmity between the Bloods and the 
Crips serves as just one example.41  At its worst, gang street fighting—
whether with knives and bludgeons 150 years ago or handguns and 
rifles today—can hold an entire neighborhood hostage.42  The 
presence of rival groups brings potential threats to an existing gang.43  
This increases gang unity and “fosters beliefs that protection comes 
from gang cohesion and the preparation for violence.”44  Gang 
violence is cyclical, strengthening the perception that gang 
membership is necessary for protection from future gang violence, 
which increases membership and perpetrates violence against rivals.45  
Gangs may even operate together to combat a common enemy; for 
instance, members and associates of some gangs in southern 
California operate independently but, if in jail, join together as the 
 
/gangs. 
 39  Key Findings: National Gang Threat Assessment 2009, supra note 38. 
 40  National Youth Gang Survey Analysis, supra note 32. 
 41  E.g., Grieving Mothers, supra note 34 (explaining the origins of the war between 
the Bloods and the Crips and noting that, for decades, the majority of gang murders 
in Los Angeles have been attributable to it). 
 42  Keith Donoghue, Note, Casualties of War: Criminal Drug Law Enforcement and its 
Special Costs for the Poor, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1778, 1786–87 (2002) (explaining that poor 
urban communities are the locus for drug transactions, which bring with them 
violence aimed to protect contested territory and intimidate potential informants.); 
ASBURY, supra note 18, at 29 (“Sometimes the battles raged for two or three days 
without cessation, while the streets of the gang area were barricaded with carts and 
paving stones, and the gangsters blazed away at each other with musket and 
pistol . . . .”); see also Videtta A. Brown, Gang Member Perpetrated Domestic Violence: A New 
Conversation, 7 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 395, 409 (2007) (“When 
gang members are present, the atmosphere in neighborhoods is riddled with fear.”). 
 43  GOTTFREDSON, supra note 32, at 7 (focusing on the rise of youth gangs in 
schools). 
 44  Id. 
 45  Id. (“[F]ear of violence leads to participation in the instigation of violence 
against sources of perceived threat.”).  It is difficult not to be reminded of the scene 
set by Thomas Hobbes as he portrayed the state of nature: 
During the time men live without a common power to keep them all in 
awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war as is 
of every man against every man . . . .  In such condition there is no 
place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and 
consequently . . . no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, 
and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, 
brutish, and short.  
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 86 (Forgotten Books 2008). 
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Eme, the so-called “Mexican Mafia.”46 
Perhaps the most fundamental aspect of gang culture is the 
strong loyalty it both inspires and demands.  The gang becomes, to 
members, “a separate, distinct and often irresistible focus of 
attraction, loyalty and solidarity.”47  By and large, whether a gang is 
made up of mere delinquents or hardened criminals willing to 
engage in gun violence, drug sales, and turf wars, all gangs retain 
cultural codes to which members adhere.48  These codes generally 
mandate solidarity and loyalty to fellow gang members,49 sometimes 
mimicking family ties.50  Many gangs have elaborate initiation 
procedures that can include getting “jumped in”—beat up by 
admitted members—to demonstrate total dedication to the gang.51  
 
 46  People v. Sisneros, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d 98, 104 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009).  The Mexican 
Mafia, or Eme, is a particularly fearsome gang that raises money by committing 
crimes, including murder, and employing various local neighborhood gangs to 
collect “taxes” from drug dealers.  Id.  A member of a street gang may become an Eme 
associate by earning money for the gang and assaulting inmates as instructed, and an 
associate may become one of its few members by gaining a sponsor and executing a 
killing on behalf of the gang.  Id.  The price of leaving the gang is death, and 
members and associates are permitted neither to admit their affiliation with the 
Mexican Mafia nor cooperate with law enforcement and inform on other affiliates.  
Id. at 103.  Cooperation among rival gangs is not new: feuding gangs in nineteenth-
century New York City at times joined to fight a common rival gang, ASBURY, supra 
note 18, at 29, or attack police to render law enforcement ineffective on their turf.  
Id. at 24, 44, 235. 
 47  COHEN, supra note 17, at 31. 
 48  See, e.g., Beth Barrett, Terror in Our Streets: A Special Report on Gang Violence in 
Southern California (L.A. Gang History Runs Deep), L.A. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 1, 2004, 
http://lang.dailnews.com/social/gangs/articles/dnp6_main.asp [hereinafter L.A. 
Gang History] (“Loyalty remains across geographic boundaries, with gang members 
keeping their affiliations as they change addresses across town or across the 
country.”). 
 49  Ellen Liang Yee, Confronting the “Ongoing Emergency”: A Pragmatic Approach to 
Hearsay Evidence in the Context of the Sixth Amendment, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 729, 777 
(2008) (observing that in gangs, “loyalty to the organization and hierarchy within the 
organization are strong forces that impact the relationships of the members of the 
organization,” causing members to be reluctant to accuse one another and unwilling 
to cooperate with law enforcement out of fear of “serious harm to the accuser’s 
welfare”). 
 50  E.g., 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ASIAN AMERICAN ISSUES TODAY 859 (Edith Wen-Chu 
Chen & Grace J. Yoo eds., ABC-CLIO, LLC 2010) (explicating that at-risk Asian 
American youths find camaraderie, security, and cultural pride in joining street 
gangs, but with these benefits comes the need to retain the respect of  this new 
“family” by witnessing or committing violent crimes). 
 51  E.g., State v. McCoy, 928 P.2d 647, 650 (Ariz. 1996) (holding as evidence 
supporting conviction for participating in a criminal street gang that the defendant 
participated in his gang’s “aggravated assaults on an ongoing basis as part of their 
ritual for initiating new members and ousting disloyal members,” called “jumping 
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Another common ritual for admittance is commission of a violent 
crime52; for instance, some violent gangs require members to commit 
murder to show their loyalty and gain full membership.53  Women 
who wish to join may be “sexed in,” or required to have sex with 
multiple gang members.54 
Street gangs vigorously enforce a ban on assisting the police.55  
Specifically, gangs discourage giving information to police—called 
“snitching”56—even if doing so would incriminate members of other 
gangs.57  With legal recourse unavailable to enforce contracts and 
 
in”). 
 52 See, e.g., People v. Garcia, 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 104, 108 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) 
(recounting expert opinion that “respect is ‘everything’ to a gang member” and that 
both gangs and gang members earn respect by committing crimes, “especially violent 
crimes”); AUGUSTINE E. COSTELLO, HISTORY OF THE POLICE DEPARTMENT OF JERSEY CITY 
229 (The Police Relief Assoc. Publ’n Co. 1891) (stating that membership in the 
Lavas gang required a robbery, burglary, a single-handed assault on a police officer, 
or going to jail as a recruit); Maureen Graham, et al., 6 Indicted in 5 N.J. Killings The 
Suspects Are Members of the Camden Gang Sons of Malcolm X, PHILLY.COM, Apr. 9, 1993, 
http://articles.philly.com/1993-04-09/news/ 
25980283_1_gang-member-murder-rate-law-enforcement. 
 53  Alan Jackson, Prosecuting Gang Cases: What Local Prosecutors Need to Know, 42-
JUN PROSECUTOR 32, 33–34 (Nat’l Dist. Attorneys Ass’n 2008); Brown, supra note 42, 
at 408.  This initiation procedure is not unique to contemporary street gang culture.  
E.g., ASBURY, supra note 18, at 227 (relating tales of the Whyo gang, which accepted 
members only after they committed a murder or other crime serious enough to 
demonstrate dedication to the gang). 
 54  Brown, supra note 42. 
 55  E.g., David Kocieniewski, So Many Crimes, and Reasons to Not Cooperate, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 30, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/30/nyregion
/30witness.html?ref=davidkocieniewski (“[T]he Whitman Park section of Camden is 
on the front lines of the struggle with witness intimidation.  An array of powerful 
forces converge here to discourage people from cooperating with the investigation of 
crimes—crimes committed against their own homes, their own neighbors, their own 
children.  Drugs are sold openly from street corners and abandoned row houses. 
Gunfire is a neighborhood soundtrack.  And the competing gangs that control 
Whitman Park have made it clear that the price for defying them is death.”). 
 56  See ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, SNITCHING 3 (2009).  Snitching was originally a word 
reserved for criminals who ratted out their associates in exchange for a lighter 
sentence or reduced charges, id., but a “mentality has started to seep into the 
neighborhood where ordinary, upstanding people who would come forward because 
a crime occurred are now being told they are snitches.”  Brendan L. Smith, Keeping A 
‘Snitch’ from Being Scratched: Witness Intimidation Is Gaining Even As the Murder Rate 
Declines, 94-DEC A.B.A. J. 20, 21 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 57  E.g., People v. Sisneros, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d 98, 103 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009).  In 
Sisneros, a shooting was perpetrated by an alleged associate of the Mexican Mafia, and 
an innocent witness—who was a member of a separate Hispanic street gang—knew 
the identity of the shooter.  Id.  Not only did the witness refuse to “snitch” to the 
police, he would not return to the neighborhood where the shooting took place, nor 
was he safe in police custody from the possibility of being beaten or killed because he 
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regulate underground commerce, gangs—particularly those involved 
in the drug trade—resort to intimidation and murder to protect their 
businesses.58  Gang members make it no secret that “ratting out” 
fellow members can have dire consequences.59  In 2004, a much-
circulated DVD titled “Stop Snitching” featured Baltimore gangsters 
who named snitches “in the game” and threatened that snitches 
might “get a hole in their head.”60  In a Colorado case,61 a defendant 
was found guilty of charges including first-degree murder for paying 
his friend and two members of an ethnic Cambodian gang a total of 
$20,000 to shoot and kill a cooperating witness after the witness 
implicated the defendant in the sale and distribution of drugs.62  “No 
Snitching” is now a popular refrain that summarizes gang culture’s 
ban on police cooperation.63  The producer of the “No Snitching” 
DVD insisted that the DVD was directed at criminal associates, not 
“civilian witnesses,”64 but it became a popular symbol that extended 
beyond the world of gangsters. 65  “Stop Snitching” tee shirts began to 
appear in courtrooms to intimidate witnesses unaffiliated with 
gangs,66 celebrity rappers publicly refused to share information about 
shootings they witnessed,67 and commentators began to cover the “No 
Snitching” phenomenon in mainstream media.68 
Today, justice goes unserved in some communities in significant 
part because the perpetrators of violent witness intimidation target 
not only gang members but also the innocent residents of gang-
 
witnessed the crime.  Id. 
 58  Stephen J. Schulhofer, Solving the Drug Enforcement Dilemma: Lessons From 
Economics, 1994 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207, 220 (1994). 
 59  See Kocieniewski, supra note 10.  
 60   NATAPOFF, supra note 56, at 122. 
 61  See generally People v. Hagos, 250 P.3d 596 (Colo. App. 2009). 
 62  Id. at 606–07.   
 63  See NATAPOFF, supra note 56. 
 64  Id. 
 65  Tom Farrey, ‘Snitching’ Controversy Goes Well Beyond ‘Melo, ESPN The Magazine, 
January 18, 2006, available at http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/columns
/story?columnist=farrey_tom&id=2296590. 
 66  See Fox Butterfield, Guns and Jeers Used by Gangs to Buy Silence, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
16, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/16/national/16gangs.html (relating 
that gang members were in the courtroom wearing tee-shirts that said “Stop 
Snitching” when two other gang members were on trial for murdering a ten-year-
old). 
 67  Rick Hampson, Anti-Snitch Campaign Riles Police, Prosecutors, USA TODAY, Mar. 
28, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-03-28-stop-snitching_x.htm 
(explaining how rappers Lil’ Kim and Busta Rhymes refused to cooperate with police 
in order to remain “credible rappers” in accordance with the “code of the street”). 
 68  NATAPOFF, supra note 56, at 122–24. 
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controlled communities.69 While “No Snitching” used to be a policy 
reserved for gang members, regular citizens in some communities are 
treated as “snitches” simply for talking to or cooperating with law 
enforcement.70  The 2000 National Youth Gang Survey stated that 
gang-related witness intimidation was reported as “common” by sixty-
six percent of responding law-enforcement agencies.71  In that same 
survey, eighty-two percent of respondents stated that their agencies 
were taking action to correct the problem.72  A general sense of fear is 
not uncommon in a gang-controlled locale marred by a history of 
violent retaliation against witnesses and a community-wide distrust of 
the criminal justice system.73 
 To compound the problem, the communities in which gangs 
proliferate tend to have a history of poor relations with local law 
enforcement on which gangs capitalize.74  Increased policing in 
violent neighborhoods, if ineffective, can generate the ire and 
distrust of the innocent civilians who reside there.75  In some urban 
communities, the sentiment persists that the police fail to protect 
racial and ethnic minorities and thus cause the epidemic of drugs 
and violence to be concentrated in those neighborhoods.76  Police 
 
 69  Id. at 124 (Gang culture’s “no snitching” code “melded with the long-standing 
problem of witness intimidation, and the related reluctance of civilian witnesses to 
come forward when they observe violent crime”). 
 70  IMAGINING LEGALITY: WHERE LAW MEETS POPULAR CULTURE 59 (Austin Sarat 
ed., Univ. of Ala. Press 2011). 
 71  John Anderson, Gang-Related Witness Intimidation, NATIONAL GANG CENTER 
BULLETIN (Feb. 2007), at 1. 
 72  Id. 
 73  PETER FINN & KERRY MURPHY HEALEY, PREVENTING GANG- AND DRUG-RELATED 
WITNESS INTIMIDATION: ISSUES AND PRACTICES 1–2 (Nat’l Inst. of Justice 1996).  This 
fear is not new: a history of the Jersey City police describes street gangs that were 
“composed of young rowdies” who would regularly insult or spit on women, but 
women would refuse to file formal complaints and “thus hinder the wheels of 
justice.”  COSTELLO, supra note 52, at 330. 
 74  NATAPOFF, supra note 56, at 126; see also PAUL B. WICE, CHAOS IN THE 
COURTROOM: THE INNER WORKINGS OF URBAN CRIMINAL COURTS 170–71 (1985) 
(observing that, in urban courts, defendants are often of lower socio-economic status 
which can affect their treatment by the court, including increasing the court’s 
willingness to incarcerate poor uneducated defendants who have been through the 
criminal justice system before). 
 75  Diana Nelson Jones, Don’t Shoot: Stopping Urban Violence with Sweet Reason, 
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Dec. 18, 2011, http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/11352
/1197140-148.stm; e.g. Julie Dressner & Edwin Martinez, The Scars of Stop & Frisk, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jun. 12, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/12/opinion/the-scars-of-
stop-and-frisk.html?_r=0 (relating the impact of “stop and frisk” on one young man 
who was “unjustifiably stopped by police more than 60 times” before he turned 18).   
 76  RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AND THE LAW 71 (Random House 1998); see, 
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brutality and racially discriminatory enforcement practices in some 
communities have led to distrust, actual and perceived injustice, and 
even rioting.77  Such a history can contribute to the acquiescence of 
entire communities to gang culture’s code of silence. 
Intimidation and retaliation against citizens in gang-controlled 
communities necessitates willful blindness to gang crimes by everyday 
citizens,78 which increases the frequency of unreported criminality 
and lessens the likelihood of convicting violent perpetrators.  People 
who live in gang-controlled communities live in fear caused by 
calculated intimidation.  For instance, an innocent citizen may, as a 
matter of course, be subject to demands for money whenever he 
leaves his home and forced to witness continual public drug 
transactions and loitering by gang members.79  If he speaks to the 
police about these crimes, he risks retaliatory physical attacks on his 
person and property.80  In a recent Michigan case, an innocent 
witness who had information about the shooter in a gang-related 
attack refused to tell the police anything until the police threatened 
to investigate him.81  He explained that the code of the street is 
 
e.g., Beth Barrett, Terror in Our Streets: A Special Report on Gang Violence in Southern 
California (Bratton’s Challenge: LAPD’s New Chief Believes Gang Problem Can Be Solved), 
L.A. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 2, 2004, http://lang.dailynews.com/socal/gangs/articles
/ALL_p1side1.asp [hereinafter Bratton’s Challenge] (explaining that history of poor 
community relations with the LAPD increases the challenge of reducing crime, and 
the solution is increased investment in police officers who can become experts on 
particular neighborhoods). 
 77  See KENNEDY, supra note 76, at 115–20 (describing instances of police brutality, 
questionable acquittals of police officers by all-white juries, and the race riots that 
subsequently ensued).  
 78  See FINN, supra note 73, at 4. 
Many of the communities in which gangs operate are worlds unto 
themselves—places where people live, attend school, and work all 
within a radius of only a few blocks beyond which they rarely venture.  
As a result, victims and witnesses are often the children of a 
defendant’s friends or relatives, members of the same church as the 
defendant, or classmates or neighbors.  Furthermore, community 
residents may regard many of the crimes for which witnesses are sought 
as “business matters” among gang members or drug dealers, rather 
than as offenses against the community which should inspire willing 
civic participation in the process of law enforcement. 
Id. 
 79  Beth Barrett, Terror in Our Streets: A Special Report on Gang Violence in Southern 
California (Living in Fear: Gangs Keep Stranglehold on Southland Cities), L.A. DAILY NEWS, 
Sept. 28, 2004, http://lang.dailynews.com/socal/gangs/articles/dnp3_gang3.asp 
[hereinafter Living in Fear]. 
 80  Id. 
 81  Jones v. Warren, No. 1:07-cv-894, 2010 WL 3779277, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 
20, 2010). 
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“[don’t] snitch,” which he had to obey out of fear for his life, even 
though he was not a gang member.82  Moreover, this “[f]ear of gang 
retaliation among honest citizens in gang-dominated neighborhoods” 
forces prosecutors to rely on unwilling or tainted witnesses, such as 
co-defendants, for testimony in gang cases because innocent 
witnesses refuse to cooperate or take the stand.83 
A prosecutor from Suffolk County, Massachusetts has said that 
witness intimidation not only “results from the tight-knit geography 
of poor neighborhoods where witnesses and gang members often 
know one another,” but also from the fact that “gang members have 
become more brazen.”84  In California, a drug addict named Bobby 
Singleton was purchasing crack cocaine in an apartment building 
controlled by a gang known as The Mob Crew when a rival gang 
member opened fire.85  Singleton, injured in the cross-fire, told police 
he could identify the shooter, a member of the Primera Flats gang.86  
When the shooter was released on bail, he appeared at Singleton’s 
residence, instructed Singleton not to appear in court, stated, “I will 
look for you and kill you,” and flashed a gun.87  Two days later, the 
shooter returned in a van with his associates and took Singleton 
away.88  Singleton was found later that night on a bench, shot to 
death.89  Such violent endings for innocent bystanders to, and victims 
of, violent crime are not rare in gang-infested communities.  Rather, 
they serve as frequent, stark reminders that all citizens—not just gang 
members—are subject to punishment for violating the “no snitching” 
code. 
Even where a witness is safe from direct intimidation by a 
defendant, other gang members will enforce the “no snitching” 
policy on the defendant’s behalf.  Gangs’ emphasis on loyalty 
coupled with their willingness to intimidate and retaliate renders it 
unsurprising when gangs interfere with a witness on behalf of a 
member who is on trial.  Gang members will appear in court as 
observers because their mere presence can frighten witnesses into not 
 
 82  Id. 
 83  FINN, supra note 73, at 4. 
 84  Butterfield, supra note 66. 
 85  Urias v. Horel, No. CV 07-7155-JVS (RNB), 2008 WL 4363064, at *2–3 (C.D. 
Cal. Aug. 25, 2008). 
 86  Id. at *3. 
 87  Id. 
 88  Id. at *4. 
 89  Id. 
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testifying.90  Such intimidation can go undetected.91  Moreover, even if 
a judge was aware of such a tactic and considered closing the 
courtroom, the defendant’s constitutional right to a public trial is 
generally paramount.92  Incarcerated witnesses are also in great 
danger of gang-related intimidation93 because gangs have associates 
in prisons that will carry out “hits” and beatings as ordered.94  Gangs 
will target civilian witnesses (such as Martha Puebla, who testified for 
the prosecution in a gang-related double-murder case and was shot 
multiple times in retaliation one week later95) and even police officers 
(such as Richard Elizondo, who in 1998 was shot and paralyzed in an 
attempted assassination days before he was to testify about a gang-
related homicide96). 
While sometimes a defendant is directly involved in ordering or 
causing witness intimidation,97 it is often difficult to prove that a gang 
member-defendant directly ordered or perpetrated the intimidation 
himself.98  Moreover, fear of a gang’s retaliation can silence a witness 
 
 90  FINN, supra note 73, at xi. 
 91  See id. 
 92  See Rachel G. Piven-Kehrle, Annotation, Basis for Exclusion of Public from State 
Criminal Trial in Order to Preserve Safety, Confidentiality, or Well-Being of Witness Who Is 
Not Undercover Police Officer, 33 A.L.R.6th 1 (2008). 
 93  FINN, supra note 73, at xi–xii; e.g., David Kocieniewski, Not Scared, or Scalded, 
Into Silence, Ex-Gang Leader Takes Stand in Trenton Murder, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2007,  
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/28/nyregion/28gang.html?ref=davidkocieniewsk
i (describing how Roberto “Bam Bam Rodriguez,” a former leader of the Latin Kings 
in Trenton, New Jersey, took the stand in a murder trial despite an attack by another 
inmate intended to silence him after he was labeled a “snitch”). 
 94  Gangster Menace, supra note 30 (explaining that today, much of the violence is 
dictated by prison gangs that order killings and other crimes from within prison). 
 95  Beth Barrett, Terror in Our Streets: A Special Report on Gang Violence in Southern 
California (Agony of Victims: Behind Each Tragedy Lie Grief and Heartache of Friends, 
Family), L.A. DAILY NEWS, Sept. 29, 2004 http://lang.dailynews.com/socal/gangs
/articles/dnp4_gang4.asp [hereinafter Agony of Victims]. 
 96  Dana Bartholomew, Terror in Our Streets: A Special Report on Gang Violence in 
Southern California (Targets of Gang Violence), L.A. DAILY NEWS, Sept. 29, 2004, 
http://lang.dailynews.com/socal/gangs/articles/dnp5_main.asp. 
 97  E.g., United States v. Baskerville, Nos. 07-2927 & 11-1175, 2011 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 20869, at *2–3 (3d Cir. Oct. 13, 2011).  Just before William Baskerville, a 
Newark, New Jersey drug kingpin, was to go to trial on drug charges, the key witness 
against Baskerville, Kemo McCray, was shot and killed by members of Baskerville’s 
“crew.”  Id.  Federal prosecutors employed forfeiture by wrongdoing to admit 
McCray’s prior statements, even though McCray was shot by an associate of 
Baskerville, not by Baskerville himself.  Id.  They were able to do so with evidence 
that Baskerville actually ordered the member of his “crew” to kill McCray.  Id.  
Baskerville was sentenced to life in prison for conspiring to murder a witness, 
retaliating against a federal informant, and distributing drugs.  Id 
 98  Smith, supra note 56, at 21 (explaining that witness intimidation is perpetrated 
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even if the defendant takes no action.  That defendant benefits from 
his gang’s “no snitching” policy without any specific request or 
participation on his part.99  The result is that a gang member-
defendant may enjoy stalled prosecutions, dropped charges, or no 
charges at all by virtue of his membership in a gang that intimidates, 
retaliates against, or murders witnesses who may otherwise be willing 
to cooperate with police.100  For instance, in the trial of two men 
charged with the drive-by shooting of an eight-year-old boy, one of 
the defendants profited from a deadlocked jury because some 
witnesses recanted their testimony and others refused to speak at all 
out of fear of gang retaliation.101  As a result, the convicted defendant 
received a life sentence, while the other smiled as he pleaded no 
contest to the reduced charge of voluntary manslaughter.102  When a 
gang enforces a “no snitching” policy against its own members and 
civilian witnesses, it substantially interferes with the criminal justice 
process, terrorizes neighborhoods, and grants a windfall to the 
defendant by virtue of his membership in a criminal enterprise. 
The echoes of witness intimidation reverberate far beyond the 
courtroom.  Urban communities have different conviction rates than 
suburban communities, depending on the type of crime.103  In urban 
areas, drug felony convictions are highest, particularly when 
compared to suburban communities, resulting in a high rate of 
imprisonment of the urban population.104  In contrast, violent 
felonies are successfully prosecuted at a significantly lower rate in 
urban neighborhoods than in suburban neighborhoods.105  This is 
partly due to “the economics of law enforcement,” which aims “to 
 
not only by defendants but also by their friends or associates, who may employ tactics 
such as packing the courtroom and staring down everyone in it).  
 99  See id. 
 100  E.g., David Kocieniewski, Few Choices in Shielding of Witnesses, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
28, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/28/nyregion/28witness.html?ref=
davidkocieniewski (detailing how, in a quadruple homicide, prosecutors were forced 
to drop all charges due to the intimidation and murder of witnesses); David 
Kocieniewski, Keeping Witnesses Off Stand to Keep Them Safe, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/19/nyregion/19witness.html?ref=davidkocieniew
ski. 
 101  Grieving Mothers, supra note 34.  Five witnesses recanted their statements to 
police and others refused to testify, which is a common problem among witnesses 
from the community, according to Deputy District Attorney Anthony J. Falangetti.  
Id. 
 102  Id.  
 103  WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 55 (2011). 
 104  Id. 
 105  Id. 
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punish as many crimes as budgets allow.”106  Drug convictions are easy 
and cheap to obtain,107 while violent crime prosecutions are pricey 
and convictions are rare.  Another key factor is that gangs—which 
operate primarily in urban communities—are incredibly effective at 
eliminating the witnesses necessary to prove violent felonies in a 
court of law.108  Because violence goes largely unpunished in areas 
blighted with widespread witness silence, similar crimes are punished 
differently depending on a community’s demographics.109  William 
Stuntz referred to this as “discriminatory justice” that “runs headlong 
into the moral argument for treating criminals and crime victims 
from different demographic groups the same.”110  Witness 
intimidation by gangs, then, has not only a local effect on crime rates, 
but a broad impact on the administration of criminal justice and its 
sociological effects. 
The heart of the problem resides within the four walls of the 
courtroom.  American trial courts rely heavily on live witness 
testimony, which means that living, willing witnesses are crucial to the 
administration of justice.111  Without witness statements as evidence, 
violent crimes will go unpunished.  One way to combat this problem 
is to admit into evidence the prior statements of witnesses who were 
intimidated or killed by gang members before trial.112  Combatting 
gang-perpetrated witness intimidation in this way will increase the 
possibility of successfully prosecuting violent gang member-
defendants and thereby decrease the payoff of intimidation.  
Admission of the prior statements of a silenced witness—presented to 
a jury only after proof of murder or intimidation by gang members—
will promote equal justice and combat the reigns of terror imposed 
by street gangs. 
II. FORFEITURE BY WRONGDOING AND GILES V. CALIFORNIA 
Successful intimidation or murder of government witnesses by 
members of a defendant’s gang weakens the government’s case and 
can force a prosecutor to drop all charges because statements by the 
 
 106  Id. (considering the effects of retributivism in poor black neighborhoods). 
 107  Id. 
 108  Id. at 79–80. 
 109  STUNTZ, supra note 103, at 55. 
 110  Id. 
 111  See id. at 79. 
 112  This can be done by a sworn deposition, but one may not be admitted as 
evidence until a defendant is charged, which limits its effectiveness against the threat 
of witness tampering.  
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now-unavailable witness may be inadmissible in court for two 
independent, but somewhat similar, reasons: (1) the statements 
satisfy no exception to the hearsay rule,113 or (2) even if they do satisfy 
an exception to the hearsay rule, the statements do not satisfy an 
exception to the constitutional right to confront adverse witnesses at 
trial.114  The doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing operates as an 
exception to both grounds of exclusion, and it should be utilized to 
admit at trial the prior statements of witnesses who are silenced by a 
defendant’s gang associates. 
A. Bars to Admission of Prior Statements by Witnesses 
1. The Evidentiary Bar to Admission: The Hearsay Rule 
Each jurisdiction creates its own rules of evidence, which 
includes the hearsay rule.  The hearsay rule strictly prohibits 
admission of out-of-court statements by absent declarants unless 
exceptions115 listed in a jurisdiction’s rules of evidence apply, even if 
the witness is unavailable116 to testify.  In a criminal case, if a witness 
refuses to take the stand, flees the jurisdiction, or dies, it is likely that 
a jury will not hear the information that the unavailable witness 
previously communicated because, commonly, no exception to the 
hearsay rule applies to such circumstances. 
One exception to the hearsay rule is the doctrine of “forfeiture 
by wrongdoing.”117  It operates to allow the admission of hearsay 
where the defendant, by his wrongdoing, caused the declarant to be 
 
 113  E.g., FED. R. EVID. 802 (setting forth the exclusionary rule that hearsay is 
inadmissible unless a federal statute, the Federal Rules of Evidence, or Supreme 
Court rules explicitly allow it).  Hearsay is “a statement that: (1) the declarant does 
not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party offers in 
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.”  FED. R. EVID. 
801(c)(1)–(2). 
 114  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 115  See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1)–(6).  Five exceptions to the hearsay rule in the 
case of witness unavailability are included in the Federal Rules of Evidence: prior 
testimony subject to cross-examination, a statement made under belief of impending 
death, a statement against interest, a statement about the declarant’s personal or 
family history, and, last but not least, forfeiture by wrongdoing.  Id. 
 116  The Federal Rules set forth examples of unavailability including exemption 
from testifying due to a privilege, refusal to testify despite a court order, lack of 
memory of the declarant’s statement, inability to testify due to death or infirmity, or 
absence from the proceedings despite reasonable attempts by the proponent of the 
statement. FED. R. EVID. 804(a).  This list is not exhaustive.  STEVEN GOODE & OLIN 
GUY WELLBORN III, COURTROOM EVIDENCE HANDBOOK: 2011–2012 STUDENT EDITION 
333 (West 2011) (“The listed grounds [in 804(a)] are illustrative, not exclusive.”). 
 117  Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 354–60 (2008).  
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unavailable to testify.118  The federal version of forfeiture by 
wrongdoing is codified in Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6).119  It 
permits admission of otherwise inadmissible testimony if the witness 
is unavailable due to the wrongdoing of the adverse party.120  
Congress adopted the Rule in 1997, and, subsequently, a number of 
states adopted various versions of it.121  It is applicable to both parties, 
not just the defendant, and typically requires that “the party against 
whom the statement is offered (1) directly, or through others (2) 
engaged in conduct that is wrongful (3) with the intent of producing 
the declarant’s unavailability, (4) which was thereby procured.”122  In 
most jurisdictions, the question of whether forfeiture occurred is 
determined by a preponderance of the evidence123 at a Rule 104(a) 
 
 118  E.g., FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6).  
 119  Id. 
 120  Id. 
 121  KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 442 (6th ed. West 2006); 
see, e.g., ARIZ. R. EVID. 804(b)(6) (“A statement offered against a party that wrongfully 
caused—or acquiesced in wrongfully causing—the declarant’s unavailability as a 
witness, and did so intending that result.”); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1390(a) (West 2012) 
(“Evidence of a statement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the 
statement is offered against a party that has engaged, or aided and abetted, in the 
wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of the declarant 
as a witness.”); DEL. R. EVID. 804(b)(6) (2001) (“A statement offered against a party 
that has engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, 
procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness.”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
90.804(2)(f) (West 2012) (“A statement offered against a party that wrongfully 
caused, or acquiesced in wrongfully causing, the declarant’s unavailability as a 
witness, and did so intending that result.”); ILL. EVID. R. 804(b)(5) (2011) (“A 
statement offered against a party that has engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that 
was intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness.”); 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 804(b)(6) (West 2012) (“A statement offered against a party 
who forfeits, by virtue of wrongdoing, the right to object to its admission based on 
findings by the court that (A) the witness is unavailable; (B) the party was involved 
in, or responsible for, procuring the unavailability of the witness; and (C) the party 
acted with the intent to procure the witness’s unavailability.”); N.J. R. EVID. 804(b)(9) 
(2011) (“A statement offered against a party who has engaged, directly or indirectly, 
in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of the 
declarant as a witness.”); PA. R. EVID. 804(b)(6) (2013) (“A statement offered against 
a party that wrongfully caused—or acquiesced in wrongfully causing—the declarant’s 
unavailability as a witness, and did so intending that result.”).  
 122  See BROUN, supra note 121, at 442.   
 123  Id.  Some states, however, have adopted a heightened “clear and convincing” 
standard of proof instead.  E.g., State v. Mason, 162 P.3d 396, 404–05 (Wash. 2007) 
(en banc), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1035 (2008) (“[T]he trial court must decide whether 
the witness has been made unavailable by the wrongdoing of the accused based upon 
evidence that is clear, cogent, and convincing.  We recognize that this is not an easy 
standard to meet, but the right of confrontation should not be easily deemed 
forfeited by an accused.”); People v. Geraci, 85 N.Y.2d 359, 367 (N.Y. 1995) (opining 
that “a defendant’s loss of the valued Sixth Amendment confrontation right 
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proceeding.124 
A gang member-defendant who knows that his associates are 
willing to intimidate adverse witnesses can expect that his gang will 
intimidate any witness that may be adverse to him.  If the gang 
associates meet the defendant’s expectation by following through 
with intimidating the adverse witness, the forfeiture exception should 
apply against the defendant because his wrongdoing—remaining in 
the gang with the expectation of witness tampering on his behalf—
caused the unavailability of the declarant.  The hearsay rule should 
be no bar to juries hearing the statements of the unavailable 
declarant because, had the defendant not joined or remained in the 
gang, its members would not have acted to protect him.  Application 
of forfeiture by wrongdoing to scenarios of gang-perpetrated 
intimidation may lessen the incentive to silence witnesses who could 
testify against gang member-defendants because intimidating or 
killing the witness would not prevent admission of his testimony.  
This could increase the safety of witnesses and would help persuade 
reluctant witnesses to testify. 
2. The Constitutional Bar to Admission: The Right of 
Confrontation 
Even if a hearsay exception—such as forfeiture by wrongdoing—
could be interpreted to allow the admission of statements by a 
declarant silenced by a defendant’s gang associates, the second 
hurdle to admission remains: would such an exception violate the 
right to confrontation? 
The Founders preserved this right in the Sixth Amendment’s 
Confrontation Clause, which states that “[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted 
with the witnesses against him.”125  This requirement applies to the 
states through incorporation by the Fourteenth Amendment.126  
Requiring live witness testimony not only protects the accuracy of the 
evidence presented to jurors, but it also “ensures a specific trial court 
process that has unique social value, insisting, with limited 
exceptions, upon the accused’s right to cross-examine witnesses in 
 
constitutes a substantial deprivation”). 
 124  GOODE, supra note 116, at 341; see FED. R. EVID. 104(a) (“The court must 
decide any preliminary question about whether . . . evidence is admissible.  In so 
deciding, the court is not bound by evidence rules, except those on privilege.”). 
 125  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 126  Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); BROUN, supra note 121, at  434.  
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court.”127  At common law, if a witness was unavailable to testify in 
court, and if the defendant did not have a meaningful opportunity to 
cross-examine the witness’s statements, then that witness’s prior 
statements were inadmissible unless one of two exceptions applied.128  
The first was declarations made by a speaker “on the brink of death 
and aware that he was dying,”129 and the second was forfeiture by 
wrongdoing.130 
While the right of confrontation was included in the Bill of 
Rights as a protection for criminal defendants, it was never 
understood to be absolute: forfeiture by wrongdoing as an exception 
to the right to confrontation is rooted in English common law,131 
specifically a 1666 case wherein the fact that the witness was “detained 
by the means or procurement of the prisoner” constituted a basis on 
which to admit the witness’s prior testimony.132  By the time of the 
Founding, forfeiture by wrongdoing was one “species of 
unavailability,” such as death and inability to travel, which were 
grounds on which to admit prior formal statements.133 
The doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing is not based on 
principles of agency or waiver, but equity: a man shall not profit from 
his wrongdoing.134  Application of forfeiture by wrongdoing does not 
 
 127  ROGER C. PARK ET AL., EVIDENCE LAW: A STUDENT’S GUIDE TO THE LAW OF 
EVIDENCE AS APPLIED IN AMERICAN TRIALS 414 (3d ed. 2004).  
 128  Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 358 (2008). 
 129  Id. 
 130  Id. at 359.  Note that the common law rules were codified in FED. R. EVID. 
804(b), discussed supra note 115. 
 131  Giles, 554 U.S. at 359 (referencing Lord Morley’s Case, 6 How. St. Tr. 769, 771 
(H.L. 1666)); Harrison’s Case, 12 How. St. Tr. 833, 851 (H.L.1692); Queen v. Scaife, 
117 Q.B. 238, 242, 117 Eng. Rep. 1271, 1273 (Q.B. 1851); 2 W. Hawkins, Pleas of the 
Crown 425 (4th ed. 1762); T. PEAKE, COMPENDIUM OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 62 (2d ed. 
1804); 1 G. GILBERT, LAW OF EVIDENCE 214 (1791)). 
 132  Giles, 554 U.S. at 359 (quoting Lord Morley’s Case, at which judges concluded 
that a witness’s having been “detained by the means or procurement of the prisoner” 
provided a basis to read testimony previously given at a coroner’s inquest.  6 How. St. 
Tr., at 770–71). 
 133  Rebecca Sims Talbott, Note, What Remains of the “Forfeited” Right to 
Confrontation? Restoring Sixth Amendment Values to the Forfeiture-by-Wrongdoing Rule in 
Light of Crawford v. Washington and Giles v. California, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1291, 1310–
11 (2010). 
 134  Giles, 554 U.S. at 379–80 (Souter, J., concurring) (asserting that in the case of 
a defendant who murdered an adverse witness, “[e]quity demands” a “showing [of] 
intent to prevent the witness from testifying” and that the majority opinion supplies 
the conclusion that “equity requires”); id. at 388 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The 
inequity consists of [Giles] being able to use the killing to keep out of court her 
statements against him.  That inequity exists whether the defendant’s state of mind is 
purposeful, intentional (i.e., with knowledge), or simply probabilistic.”); PARK, supra 
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require a defendant to knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to 
confrontation; rather, “the Rule withdraws the right” in response to 
the defendant’s behavior.135 
A careful analysis of forfeiture by wrongdoing as a common law 
exception to the right of confrontation—and of the Supreme Court’s 
recent treatment of forfeiture as such—suggests that its use as a basis 
to admit the prior statements136 of witnesses silenced by a defendant’s 
gang associates is constitutional, not barred by relevant Supreme 
Court jurisprudence, and in harmony with the equitable spirit of the 
doctrine. 
3. The Relationship Between the Evidentiary and 
Constitutional Bars 
While the application of forfeiture by wrongdoing (as either an 
evidentiary or constitutional exception) may appear straight-forward, 
the requisite analysis is not.  The Supreme Court recently held that, 
for purposes of a criminal defendant’s constitutional confrontation 
rights, hearsay proffered by the prosecution comprises two subsets: 
“testimonial” statements and “non-testimonial” statements.137  Non-
testimonial statements are subject only to rules of evidence, so 
movants need only overcome the hearsay rule and other evidentiary 
hurdles to admit a non-testimonial statement.  A showing that the 
defendant “acquiesced” in making the witness unavailable satisfies the 
federal forfeiture by wrongdoing hearsay exception.138  Defendants 
are protected from the admission of prior testimonial statements, 
however, by the Confrontation Clause.139  Forfeiture by wrongdoing is 
an exception to the constitutional right of confrontation.  The 
Supreme Court stated in Reynolds v. United States, the case in which it 
first recognized forfeiture by wrongdoing, that: 
[t]he constitutional right of a prisoner to confront the 
 
note 127, at 378 (“The forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception arises not “from a belief 
that such statements are reliable, but rather from an equitable principle that parties 
should not be able to benefit from the absence of a declarant whom they made 
unavailable.”). 
 135  PARK, supra note 127, at 378. 
 136  Both “non-testimonial” and “testimonial.” 
 137  Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51–53 (2004).  I will omit quotation 
marks throughout the remainder of this note, but see note 12 supra regarding the 
Supreme Court’s usage of the word “testimonial.” 
 138  FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6); see, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 286 F.3d 950, 964 
(7th Cir. 2002) (explaining that “acquiescence itself is an act” and adopting the 
dictionary definition of “acquiescence”: “to accept or comply passively or tacitly”). 
 139  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
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witness and cross-examine him is not to be abrogated, 
unless it be shown that the witness is dead, or out of the 
jurisdiction of the court; or that having been summoned, he 
appears to have been kept away by the adverse party on the 
trial.140 
The Reynolds court thus recognized forfeiture by wrongdoing as an 
exception to the right of confrontation where the defendant engaged 
in “wrongful conduct designed to prevent a witness’s testimony.”141 
Until recently, the Supreme Court required only that an out-of-
court statement by an unavailable declarant bore “adequate ‘indicia 
of reliability’” stemming from a “firmly rooted hearsay exception” or 
“particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” for its admission to 
pass constitutional muster.142  The effect was that satisfaction of the 
hearsay rules generally indicated that the Confrontation Clause 
requirements were satisfied.143  In 2004, however, the Supreme Court 
dispensed with the “indicia of reliability” scheme when it decided 
Crawford v. Washington.144  Observing that the Confrontation Clause 
was intended to combat the use of ex parte examinations in favor of 
English common law’s preferred practice of live testimony in an 
adversarial process,145 the Court held, after an historical analysis, that 
lower courts should employ a categorical framework: testimonial 
statements may be “admitted only where the declarant is unavailable, 
and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-
examine.”146  Conversely, non-testimonial statements by an out-of-
court witness are no longer subject to Confrontation Clause exclusion 
at all.147 
The Court interpreted the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right 
“to be confronted with the witnesses against him”148 to apply only to 
 
 140  Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 151–52 (1878) (emphasis omitted); see 
Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 366 (2008) (explaining Reynolds is first case in which 
the Supreme Court recognized forfeiture by wrongdoing). 
 141  Giles, 554 U.S. at 366. 
 142  Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v. Washington, 
541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 143  Park, supra note 127, at 415.  
 144  See generally 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 145  BROUN, supra note 121, at 437. 
 146  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59. 
 147  Id. at 68 (“Where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with 
the Framers’ design to afford the States flexibility in their development of hearsay 
law . . . .”). 
 148  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
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“those who ‘bear testimony,’”149 which meant, historically, to make a 
“solemn declaration.”150  The Court set forth a new “primary purpose” 
test to determine whether a statement is testimonial, explaining 
“[w]ithout attempting to produce an exhaustive classification of all 
conceivable statements” that testimonial statements are those made 
with the intent to establish facts relevant to a future prosecution 
when there is no ongoing emergency.151  In contrast, the Court 
defined non-testimonial statements as those made “under 
circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the 
interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing 
emergency.”152  So, in accordance with the Court’s interpretation, the 
right of confrontation requires that testimonial statements—those 
made outside of emergency circumstances and that establish facts 
relevant to future prosecution153—are inadmissible unless offered by 
the declarant’s live testimony or unless an exception, like forfeiture 
by wrongdoing, applies. 
B. Giles v. California’s Limited Scope Does Not Encompass Gang-
perpetrated Witness Intimidation 
The Supreme Court most recently treated forfeiture by 
wrongdoing in Giles v. California,154 in which the Court set forth an 
 
 149  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51. 
 150  Id. (quoting 1 N. WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE (1828)).  
 151  Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006) (Testimonial statements 
include those “taken by police officers in the course of interrogation . . . when the 
circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that 
the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events 
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.”); Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 
(explaining that statements made in a police interrogation are testimonial, as in the 
facts of Crawford, as well as those made at a preliminary hearing, a grand jury, or a 
former trial). 
 152  Davis, 574 U.S. at 822; Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51, 56 (including in its description 
of non-testimonial statements “an off-hand, overheard remark,” “a casual remark to 
an acquaintance,” and “business records or statements in furtherance of a 
conspiracy”). 
 153  See supra note 151 and accompanying text.  For specific applications of the test 
set forth in Crawford by the Supreme Court, see, e.g., Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 
2221 (2012) (expert testimony declaring a DNA profile matches other evidence); 
Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011) (victim’s statements to police); 
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S.Ct. 2705 (2011) (blood-alcohol analysis report 
admitted through testimony of non-testing, non-certifying analyst); Melendez-Diaz v. 
Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009) (government analysts’ certificates of analysis 
identifying substance); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006) (statements made 
during police interrogation conducted during emergency). 
 154  554 U.S. 353 (2008). 
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intent requirement155 grounded in the right to confront adverse 
witnesses.  Prior to Giles, two distinct lines of cases had developed 
concerning the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing.156  In the first 
line, courts required that the prosecution prove that the defendant 
performed some act with the specific intent to render a particular 
witness unavailable at trial in order to invoke the exception, while, in 
the other, the courts were willing to admit the statements even where 
proof of specific intent was lacking.157  The Supreme Court in Giles 
approved the former approach in a case where the defendant was on 
trial for murdering the declarant.158 
A “specific intent” requirement may seem, at first glance, to 
foreclose the application of forfeiture by wrongdoing to testimonial 
statements by witnesses who are unavailable due to the action of a 
defendant’s gang because evidence of the defendant’s intent to 
silence an adverse witness (such as, for example, a recorded phone 
conversation during which the defendant instructs his cohorts to kill 
the witness to eliminate her testimony) is usually prohibitively 
difficult to obtain.  A close reading of Giles, however, reveals that the 
specific intent requirement may not apply to gang-perpetrated 
witness intimidation at all. 
1. Facts & Procedural History 
In Giles v. California, Dwayne Giles was tried and convicted for 
the murder of his girlfriend, Avie.159  During trial, the prosecution 
offered and the trial court admitted statements Avie had made to her 
sister describing how Giles harmed her, including by choking and 
 
 155  Id. at 367  (“[T]he exception applies only if the defendant has in mind the 
particular purpose of making the witness unavailable.”) (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted).  For more on specific intent, see infra note 198. 
 156  Marc McAllister, Down But Not Out: Why Giles Leaves Forfeiture by Wrongdoing 
Still Standing, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 393, 397 (2009). 
 157  Id. For courts that did not, prior to Giles, require specific intent to silence a 
witness as a predicate to forfeiture by wrongdoing, see, e.g., United States v. Garcia-
Meza, 403 F.3d 364, 370–71 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Mayhew, 380 F. Supp. 2d 
961, 967–68 (S.D. Ohio 2005); State v. Meeks, 88 P.3d 789, 793–95 (Kan. 2004), 
overruled in part by State v. Davis, 158 P.3d 317 (Kan. 2006); State v. Jensen, 727 
N.W.2d 518, 534 (Wis. 2007).  For courts that did, prior to Giles, require a showing of 
specific intent, see, e.g., People v. Moreno, 160 P.3d 242, 245–46 (Colo. 2007); 
Commonwealth v. Edwards, 830 N.E.2d 158, 170 (Mass. 2005); State v. Romero, 133 
P.3d 842, 855–56 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006), aff’d, 156 P.3d 694 (N.M. 2007). 
 158  See generally Giles, 544 U.S. 353 (2008); e.g., Hunt v. State, 218 P.3d 516, 518 
(Okla. Crim. App. 2009). 
 159  Giles, 544 U.S. at 357. 
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hitting her.160  While the case was on appeal, the Supreme Court 
decided Crawford.161  Subsequently, Giles argued that his right to 
confrontation had been violated by the admission of Avie’s 
statements, which were unconfronted.162  The California Court of 
Appeal and the California Supreme Court upheld the conviction,163 
and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.164 
After assuming that the statements of Avie in question were 
testimonial,165 the Supreme Court, in its main opinion, “ask[ed] 
whether the theory of forfeiture by wrongdoing accepted by the 
California Supreme Court is a founding-era exception to the 
confrontation right.”166  It summarized the reasoning of the California 
Supreme Court as follows: “Giles had forfeited his right to confront 
Avie because he had committed the murder for which he was on trial, 
and because his intentional criminal act made Avie unavailable to 
testify.”167  The Supreme Court ultimately disapproved of this 
reasoning and opined that Avie’s prior statements should not have 
been admitted into evidence without a showing that the defendant 
specifically intended to prevent her in-court testimony. 168  
Accordingly, the Supreme Court remanded the case for a decision 
consistent with its opinion.169 
 
 160  Id. at 356. 
 161  Id. at 357. 
 162  See id. 
 163  Id. 
 164  Id. 
 165  Giles, 544 U.S. at 358. 
 166  Id. at 358.  The majority opinion also states in its introduction that it will 
“consider” the broader question of “whether a defendant forfeits his Sixth 
Amendment right to confront a witness against him when a judge determines that a 
wrongful act by the defendant made the witness unavailable to testify at trial.”  Id. at 
355. 
 167  Id. at 357.  This framing of the certified question is similar to the question as 
characterized in the parties’ briefs.  The Petitioner posed the question: “[d]oes a 
criminal defendant ‘forfeit’ his or her Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause 
claims upon a mere showing that the defendant has caused the unavailability of a 
witness, as some courts have held, or must there also be an additional showing that 
the defendant’s actions were undertaken for the purpose of preventing the witness 
from testifying, as other courts have held?”  Giles v. California, 544 U.S. 353, Brief of 
Petitioner i, Feb. 20, 2008, 2008 WL 494948.  The State of California characterized 
the question on appeal as “[w]hether a defendant who murders a witness may 
complain that the witness is unavailable for cross-examination.” Giles v. California, 
544 U.S. 353, Respondent’s Brief on the Merits i, March 19, 2008, 2008 WL 904073. 
 168  Giles, 554 U.S. at 377. 
 169  Id.  On remand, the California Court of Appeals found that Avie’s statements 
were testimonial and the prosecution failed to present evidence that Giles killed her 
with the “intent to prevent her from testifying or cooperating in a criminal 
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2. The Court’s Fractured Opinion 
Splintered Supreme Court opinions seem increasingly common, 
and Giles is no exception.  Justice Scalia wrote for a fractured 
majority.  He was joined in full by Justices Thomas and Alito (each 
filed separate concurrences) and in part by Justices Souter and 
Ginsburg (Justice Ginsburg joined a concurrence by Justice Souter).  
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens and Kennedy, dissented.  
The result is five separate opinions, three of which are 
concurrences.170  Justice Scalia’s opinion is in this Comment termed 
the “main opinion” because the preponderance of it claims the 
support of a majority (six justices), while one portion of it, part D-2, 
claims the support of a plurality (four justices).  With a bench so 
riven, determining which of its statements are binding declarations 
and which are dicta is no simple feat. 
3. The Holding Controls Only When Defendants Are on 
Trial for Murdering the Declarant 
Following a recapitulation the facts and procedural history of 
the case, Scalia, author of the main opinion in Giles, quickly 
dispensed with the dying declaration doctrine as inapplicable to the 
facts.171  He next stated that forfeiture by wrongdoing is a second 
common law exception to the right of confrontation recognized by 
the Supreme Court172 and commenced an examination of the words 
and definitions used to define forfeiture by wrongdoing at common 
law.173  Scalia, citing various English cases, observed that “the terms 
used to define the scope of the forfeiture rule suggest that the 
exception applied only when the defendant engaged in conduct 
 
investigation.”  People v. Giles, No. B166937, 2009 WL 457832 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 
2009).  Upon retrial, Giles was convicted of first degree murder.  People v. Giles, 
B224629, 2012 WL 130659, 1 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2012), unpublished/noncitable 
(Jan. 18, 2012), review denied (Apr. 11, 2012), reh’g denied (Feb. 17, 2012). 
 170  In their concurrences, Justices Thomas and Alito each concurred fully in the 
reasoning of the opinion as it pertains to the application of forfeiture by 
wrongdoing. Giles, 554 U.S. at 377–78. They wrote separately to emphasize their view 
that Avie’s statements were outside the ambit of the Confrontation Clause.  Id. 
 171  Id. at 358–59 (noting that the statements in question were not made under 
belief of impending death). 
 172  Id.  
 173  The dissent accepts this method of analysis to determine the scope of the 
exception at the time of the Founding but reaches a different conclusion.  Giles, 554 
U.S. at 381–83 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Like the majority, I believe it is important to 
recognize the relevant history . . . . The remaining question concerns the precise 
metes and bounds of the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception.”).  
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designed to prevent the witness from testifying.”174  Scalia concluded 
that “[t]he manner in which the rule was applied makes plain that 
unconfronted testimony would not be admitted without a showing 
that the defendant intended to prevent a witness from testifying.”175  
Next addressing U.S. post-Founding precedent, Scalia observed that 
Reynolds was “never” invoked in murder prosecutions to support 
admission of a victim’s prior inculpatory statements,176 and the 
Reynolds holding relied upon the common law precedent set forth in 
the main Giles opinion as well as the equitable roots of the doctrine.177  
Scalia noted that the earliest case identified by the parties and amici 
wherein the unconfronted statements of a declarant-victim were 
admitted against a defendant-attacker via forfeiture by wrongdoing 
was decided as recently as 1985 (there, the defendant was convicted 
 
 174  Giles, 554 U.S. at 359–60.  These include “means,” “contrivance,” 
“procurement,” etc. 
 175  Id. at 361.  According to Scalia, the forfeiture exception did not apply where a 
defendant merely caused the absence without doing so to prevent testimony.  Scalia 
noted that, where defendants were charged with the death of the declarant, 
forfeiture was not argued by lawyers who either had precarious proof of a dying 
declaration or were patently unable to prove a dying declaration.  Id. at 362, 364.  
Moreover, he noted that cases in which the dying declaration exception did apply 
still lacked theories of forfeiture, which (if causation were sufficient) could be shown 
simply by putting on the case in chief.  Id. at 364.  As noted in the opinion, the State 
of California argued that, in those cases, the commission of wrongdoing caused the 
forfeiture of confrontation rights, not of hearsay rights.  Id. at 364–65.  Scalia 
countered by arguing that no treatise supports the State’s view, and it would be 
“surprising” if correct because, at common law, courts excluded hearsay “because it 
was unconfronted,” id. at 365, suggesting that a defendant who forfeited his 
confrontation rights would not enjoy the benefit of the hearsay rule. 
 176  Giles, 544 U.S. at 367.  In Reynolds v. United States, a defendant kept his wife 
away from authorities, rendering her unavailable, so her prior statements were 
admitted in her absence.  98 U.S. 145, 149–50 (1878).  The Supreme Court, in 
affirming the trial court’s decision, invoked forfeiture by wrongdoing as an exception 
to confrontation.  Id. at 158 (explaining that “[t]he Constitution does not guarantee 
an accused person against the legitimate consequences of his own wrongful acts”).  
In doing so, it purported to adopt a rule of “long-established usage” which “is the 
outgrowth of a maxim based on the principles of common honesty.”  Id. at 159.  The 
court relied on common law cases including  Lord Morley’s Case (6 State Trials, 770) 
(1666) (resolving that “if their lordships were satisfied by the evidence they had 
heard that the witness was detained by means or procurement of the prisoner, then 
the [prior] examination [of the witness] might be read”); Harrison’s Case, and Regina 
v. Scaife (17 Ad. & El. N.S. 242) (“all the judges agreed that if the prisoner had 
resorted to a contrivance to keep a witness out of the way, the deposition of the 
witness, taken before a magistrate and in the presence of the prisoner, might be 
read.”).  
 177  Giles, 554 U.S. at 366–67 (explaining that the Reynolds court relied on 
equitable maxims and cited the leading common-law cases). 
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of the murder of the declarant),178 and the Supreme Court has never 
recognized such an application of the doctrine.179 
The main opinion concludes that the exception that the 
California court endorsed—forfeiture of confrontation rights where 
the alleged murderer killed a declarant-victim without specific intent 
to silence the victim—is not an exception to the Confrontation 
Clause.180  The main opinion contains a summary of the majority’s 
rationales. It designates as “highly persuasive” (1) “the most natural 
reading of the common law,” (2) the absence of common-law cases 
admitting prior statements on a forfeiture theory when the defendant 
had not engaged in conduct designed to prevent a witness from 
testifying,” and (3) “a subsequent history in which the dissent’s broad 
forfeiture theory has not been applied.”181  It then designates as 
“conclusive . . . the common law’s uniform exclusion of unconfronted 
inculpatory testimony by murder victims . . . in the innumerable cases in 
which the defendant was on trial for killing the victim, but was not shown 
to have done so for the purpose of preventing testimony.”182  This 
ultimate rationale is as narrow as the question originally presented183 
and suggests that the Court’s holdingrequiring specific intent by 
the defendant to silence the witness—controls only a subset of cases: 
those in which the defendant is on trial for the murder of the 
declarant. 
The focus of the main opinion is almost exclusively on cases 
wherein the defendant is on trial for the murder of a victim, 
admission of whose statements are sought by means other than 
forfeiture by wrongdoing or denied under a theory of forfeiture by 
wrongdoing.184  The Court does reference cases wherein third parties 
 
 178  Giles, 455 U.S. at 367 (citing United States v. Rouco, 765 F.2d 983 (1985)). 
 179  Id. 
 180  Id. at 368. 
 181  Id. 
 182  Id. (emphasis added). 
 183  See supra notes 166 & 167 and accompanying text. 
 184  See Smith v. State, 28 Tenn. 9, 23 (1848) (statements of victim inadmissible as 
forfeiture by wrongdoing and therefore excluded); Lewis v. State, 17 Miss. 115, 120 
(1847) (statements of victim inadmissible as forfeiture by wrongdoing and therefore 
excluded); Nelson v. State, 26 Tenn. 542, 543 (1847) (statements of victim 
inadmissible as forfeiture by wrongdoing and therefore excluded); Montgomery v. 
State, 11 Ohio 424, 425–26 (1842) (statements of victim inadmissible as forfeiture by 
wrongdoing and therefore excluded); United States v. Woods, 28 F. Cas. 762, 763 (No. 
16,760) (C.C. D.C. 1834) (statements of victim inadmissible as forfeiture by 
wrongdoing and therefore excluded); King v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. 78 (Gen. Ct. 
1817) (admission of victim’s statements sought only on dying declaration basis); 
Gibson v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. 111 (Gen. Ct. 1817) (admission of victim’s 
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silence a witness on a defendant’s behalf—in those cases, forfeiture is 
invoked successfully.185 
Justice Souter’s concurrence,186 joined by Justice Ginsburg, 
similarly indicates the narrow scope of Giles.  Souter agreed that 
Scalia’s “historical analysis is sound” but noted that Justice Breyer, in 
dissent, engaged in a similar methodology and reached a different 
result.187  The “contrast” of Scalia and Breyer’s “careful examinations 
of the historical record” persuaded Souter that the record is 
inconclusive.188  Unlike the main opinion, the reasoning of this 
critical concurrence (which speaks for two of the six majority votes) 
rests on the “rationale” that “equity demands” a specific intent 
requirement to avoid the “near circularity” that results where a judge 
presiding over a murder trial may find, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that a defendant is guilty of the murder of a declarant 
before a jury finds that same defendant guilty of that same murder 
beyond a reasonable doubt.189  In other words, the “rationale” that 
“persuades [Souter, and presumably Ginsburg also,] that the Court’s 
conclusion is the right one”190 is one that only makes sense in cases 
where a defendant is on trial for the murder of a declarant, and it is a 
 
statements sought only on dying declaration basis); Anthony v. State, 19 Tenn. 265 
(1838) (admission of victim’s statements sought only on dying declaration basis); 
King v. Dingler, 2 Leach 561, 168 Eng. Rep. 383 (1791) (unconfronted statements of 
victim inadmissible as dying declarations, under Marian statute, and as best evidence 
and therefore excluded); Thomas John’s Case, 1 East 357, 358 (P.C. 1790) 
(statements of victim inadmissible as forfeiture by wrongdoing and therefore 
excluded); Welbourn’s Case, 1 East 358, 360 (P.C. 1792) (statements of victim 
inadmissible as forfeiture by wrongdoing and therefore excluded); King v. 
Woodcock, 1 Leach 500, 168 Eng. Rep. 352 (1789) (unconfronted statements of 
victim admitted as dying declaration but inadmissible under Marian statute).  
 185  Rex v. Barber, 1 Root 76 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1775) (admitting hearsay 
evidencing statements of a witness who had previously testified against the defendant 
but was “sent away” by a friend of the defendant, “and by his instigation,” prior to 
testifying before the petit-jury); Harrison’s Case, 12 How. St. Tr., at 851 (hearsay 
admitted where “[a]n agent of the defendant had attempted to bribe [the 
declarant], who later disappeared under mysterious circumstances”: “Mr. Harrison’s 
agents or friends . . . made or conveyed away a young man that was a principal 
evidence against him”) (cited in Giles, 554 U.S. at 370).  
 186  See generally Giles, 554 U.S. 353, 379–80 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 187  Id. (“The contrast between the Court’s and Justice Breyer’s careful 
examinations of the historical record tells me that the early cases on the exception 
were not calibrated finely enough to answer the narrow question here.”). 
 188  Justice Breyer seemed to agree, id. at 396 (“I also recognize the possibility that 
there are too few old records available for us to draw firm conclusions.”), rendering a 
majority of the court in agreement that the historical record is inconclusive. 
 189  Giles, 554 U.S. at 379. 
 190  Id. at 380. 
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prior testimonial statement of that declarant that the prosecution 
seeks to admit through forfeiture by wrongdoing.  This rationale, the 
outcome of which requires a showing of specific intent as a matter of 
constitutional law, simply cannot apply to situations wherein a gang, 
acting on behalf of a gang member-defendant, silences a witness to 
his crime because the defendant is not on trial for the witness’s 
murder: no such “near circularity” would result. 
Where there is a set of fractured opinions that do not reflect a 
coherent majority statement of legal doctrine, it is appropriate to 
treat the holding as the narrowest principle that supports the 
outcome on the facts.191  In this case, the facts are that the defendant, 
Giles, was on trial for the murder of the declarant, Avie, whose 
testimonial statements were admitted without a showing that Giles 
murdered Avie with the specific intent to silence her.  The narrowest 
ground shared by the main and concurring opinions that is necessary 
to support the outcome of the decisionthe requirement of specific 
intentis that such specific intent is a necessary requisite only where 
the defendant is on trial for the declarant’s murder. 
In short, Scalia, joined by Thomas, Alito, and Chief Justice 
Roberts, asserted that the common law allowed forfeiture only where 
there was specific intent to tamper with witnesses.  Souter, joined by 
Ginsburg, was not fully persuaded by the historical record but 
nonetheless concurred on the basis of a policy rationale, opining that 
equity would doubtlessly abhor forfeiture where a judge deems a 
murder defendant guilty by a preponderance standard before a jury 
has the chance to agree beyond a reasonable doubt.  In light of this, 
the holding of Giles is reasonably stated as follows: if the defendant is 
on trial for the murder of a declarant whose unconfronted 
testimonial statements the prosecution seeks to admit, then the 
prosecution must show the defendant committed murder with the 
specific intent to prevent the victim from testifying.  Given this 
narrow scope, Giles does not directly apply to those cases wherein 
gang members take it upon themselves to silence witnesses to gang 
crime pursuant to a “no snitching” policy on behalf of a defendant.  
The holding only applies to cases in which the prosecution seeks to 
use forfeiture by wrongdoing to admit the statements of a victim 
whose alleged murderer is on trial for that crime.  In all other cases, 
the necessity of specific intent to silence a particular witness is yet to 
be determined, and there are good arguments for why the specific 
 
 191  See generally Tristan C. Pelham-Webb, Powelling for Precedent: “Binding” 
Concurrences, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 693, 695–96 (2009). 
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intent requirement should not apply in the gang cases just described. 
C.  Even if Giles is Applied to Cases of Gang-perpetrated Witness 
Intimidation, a Three-part Test Should be Used for Application of 
Forfeiture by Wrongdoing. 
The question remains: what standard will satisfy the 
constitutional demands of the Confrontation Clause and the 
equitable demands of forfeiture by wrongdoing in the case of gang-
perpetrated witness tampering?  In Giles, the dissent and majority 
differed over the question of whether a “knowledge” standard—that 
is, knowledge by the defendant that the witness would be unable to 
testify because of the defendant’s act of killing her—should suffice 
(as the dissent argued) or whether “specific intent to silence” must be 
proved (as a majority held).  The main concern shared by a majority 
of the court in Giles was that, without the specific intent requirement, 
a judge may on his own find a defendant “guilty as charged.”192  This 
concern is not present in the typical case of gang-perpetrated witness 
intimidation because the defendant is not typically on trial for 
making a witness unavailable, but for committing some other crime 
about which the witness had material information.  Nonetheless, even 
if the Supreme Court requires “specific intent” to be shown in such 
cases, the main opinion did not define what suffices to demonstrate a 
sufficient showing of specific intent in all cases.  It mentioned a 
consensus among commentators that “intent” is “the particular 
purpose of making the witness unavailable,”193 and it decried the 
dissent’s claim that “knowledge is sufficient to show intent.”194  In the 
case of gang-perpetrated witness intimidation, if a gang member-
defendant sees his gang protect other members through witness 
intimidation yet remains an active gang member, then, assuming he 
benefits from that enforcement policy when adverse witnesses in his 
trial are so silenced, his specific intent may be shown by a 
 
 192  See Giles, 554 U.S. at 365 (Scalia, J.) (“The notion that judges may strip the 
defendant of a right that the Constitution deems essential to a fair trial, on the basis 
of a prior judicial assessment that the defendant is guilty as charged, does not sit well 
with the right to trial by jury.”); id., at 379 (Souter, J., concurring in part) (“If the 
victim’s prior statement were admissible solely because the defendant kept the 
witness out of court by committing homicide, admissibility of the victim’s statement 
to prove guilt would turn on finding the defendant guilty of the homicidal act 
causing the absence; evidence that the defendant killed would come in because the 
defendant probably killed.”). 
 193  Id. at 367 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 194  Id. at 368. 
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preponderance of the evidence. 195  The “knowledge” versus “intent” 
debate in Giles was, arguably, about a distinction without a practical 
difference because in many cases the same evidence would be offered 
(and sufficient) to prove either knowledge or intent.196  Similarly, 
 
 195  Recall Wigmore’s “doctrine of chances” as a means to prove intent, which he 
explained as “the instinctive recognition of that logical process which eliminates the 
element of innocent intent by multiplying instances of the same result until it is 
perceived that this element cannot explain them all.”  JOHN H. WIGMORE, THE 
PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL PROOF AS GIVEN BY LOGIC, PSYCHOLOGY, AND GENERAL 
EXPERIENCE AND ILLUSTRATED IN JUDICIAL TRIALS 133 (Little, Brown, and Co. 1913).  
By way of example, he described two hunters in the woods, with hunter A walking 
ahead of hunter B.  Id.  If hunter A hears a bullet whistle past his head once, he is 
willing to assume hunter B accidently pulled the trigger or aimed poorly.  Id.  But if, 
soon after, a second bullet goes by, and then a third, which strikes him, hunter A may 
well assume hunter B intended the shot [to do what?].  Id. 
 196  In recognizing the challenge of proving specific intent, specifically in 
domestic violence scenarios, the Court sanctioned allowing an “inference of intent” 
from the facts and circumstances surrounding the case, even though none may 
directly bear on the state of mind of the defendant in the culminating act of abuse.  
Justice Scalia in the main opinion said that intent may be inferred in the case of an 
abuser who kills his victim if there is a history of abuse and intimidation intended to 
prevent his victim from seeking assistance or testifying against him. Giles, 554 U.S. at 
377. His oft-cited treatment of domestic violence states outright that intent can be 
inferred from a history of violence and intimidation: 
Acts of domestic violence often are intended to dissuade a victim from 
resorting to outside help, and include conduct designed to prevent 
testimony to police officers or cooperation in criminal prosecutions.  
Where such an abusive relationship culminates in murder, the 
evidence may support a finding that the crime expressed the intent to 
isolate the victim and to stop her from reporting abuse to the 
authorities or cooperating with a criminal prosecution—rendering her 
prior statements admissible under the forfeiture doctrine.  Earlier 
abuse, or threats of abuse, intended to dissuade the victim from 
resorting to outside help would be highly relevant to this inquiry, as 
would evidence of ongoing criminal proceedings at which the victim 
would have been expected to testify.   
Id.  In short, Justice Scalia acknowledged that in the case of domestic violence, 
evidence of a history of abuse or threats of abuse by the abuser is relevant to whether 
the act of killing his victim was intended to silence her.  Id. 
 Justice Souter agreed that a history of domestic abuse or threats intended to 
dissuade a victim from speaking to authorities can give rise to an inference that, in 
the alleged murder, the defendant intended to silence the witness, even if there is no 
evidence of the defendant’s state of mind at the time of the murder.  E.g., id. at 380 
(Souter, J., concurring).  In his concurrence, Justice Souter observed that a historical 
examination reveals a dearth of “any reason to doubt that the element of intention 
would normally be satisfied by the intent inferred on the part of the domestic abuser 
in the classic abusive relationship, which is meant to isolate the victim from outside 
help, including the aid of law enforcement and the judicial process.” Id. In other 
words, a history of isolation from law enforcement imposed by the abusive defendant 
can give rise to the inference of specific intent to prevent testimony.  Justice Souter 
made the case by suggesting that “[i]f the evidence for admissibility shows a 
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whether a knowledge- or intent-based standard is applied to gang-
perpetrated witness intimidation, the test ought not to involve such 
specificity as to require that the defendant knew of and intended 
particular acts against a particular witness.  Instead, “wrongdoing” 
ought to be provable by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
defendant (1) joined or remained a member of a gang, (2) with 
knowledge that the gang silences witnesses by intimidation or 
retaliation, and (3) members of the defendant’s gang caused the 
unavailability of a declarant.  In such a case, the gang member-
defendant should forfeit his right to confront that declarant. 
Direct evidence197 of intent198 is rarely available, so circumstantial 
evidence is generally relied upon in proving intent. In gang cases, 
circumstantial evidence of intent to silence witnesses would include 
evidence supporting the defendant’s voluntary entrance and 
continued membership in a gang plus evidence supporting the 
defendant’s knowledge that the gang intimidates witnesses.  The 
prosecution may call on a variety of sources for the necessary proof, 
 
continuing relationship of this sort, it would make no sense to suggest that the 
oppressing defendant miraculously abandoned the dynamics of abuse the instant 
before he killed his victim, say, in a fit of anger.”  Id. at 380. 
 While Scalia emphasizes that the standard is not “knowledge-based intent,” he 
suggests that the treatment of domestic violence should be the same under Giles as 
any other serious crime.  Id. at 376 (“In any event, we are puzzled by the dissent’s 
decision to devote its peroration to domestic abuse cases.  Is the suggestion that we 
should have one Confrontation Clause (the one the Framers adopted and Crawford 
described) for all other crimes, but a special, improvised, Confrontation Clause for 
those crimes that are frequently directed against women?  Domestic violence is an 
intolerable offense that legislatures may choose to combat through many means-
from increasing criminal penalties to adding resources for investigation and 
prosecution to funding awareness and prevention campaigns.  But for that serious 
crime, as for others, abridging the constitutional rights of criminal defendants is not 
in the State’s arsenal.”).  
 197  Direct evidence is defined as “[p]roof which speaks directly to the issue, 
requiring no support by other evidence; proof in testimony out of the witness’ own 
knowledge, as distinguished from evidence of circumstances from which inferences 
must be drawn if it is to have probative effect.”  BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(2010). 
 198  Intent is generally divided into two categories: “general intent” and “specific 
intent.”  Historically, “specific intent” meant a “particular mental state” expressly 
required by the offense, as opposed to “general intent,” which meant the 
“blameworthy state of mind” required for most offenses that did not otherwise 
require a specified mens rea.  JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 138  
(6th ed., LexisNexis 2012).  Today, “specific intent” can mean the purpose of causing 
“the social harm set out in the definition of the offense.”  Alternatively, “specific 
intent” may mean (1) the “purpose to do some future act, or to achieve some further 
consequence . . . beyond the conduct or result that constitutes the actus reus of the 
offense”; or (2) the state of being “aware of a statutory attendant circumstance.”  Id.  
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including former gang members, incarcerated gang members and 
other cooperating witnesses, confidential informants, innocent 
observers, police officers, and gang experts to testify that the gang has 
intimidated witnesses in the past, that it does so as a regular practice, 
that the defendant was a member of the gang, and that he would 
have known about the intimidation tactics employed by the gang.199  
Thisin conjunction with evidence supporting the finding that a 
declarant was made unavailable to testify by intimidation, threats of 
retaliation, or physical harm perpetrated by gang associates of the 
defendantshows not only knowledge of the intimidation by the 
defendant, but also an expectation that it would occur, giving rise to 
an inference of intent sufficiently specific to satisfy any reasonable 
construction of Giles. 
Suppose person A enters into an arrangement with friend B 
such that if A commits a crime in the future and is caught, friend B 
agrees to unilaterally and without further consultation take measures, 
including such witness tampering as may be necessary, up to and 
including murder, to prevent A’s conviction.  Suppose then that A 
commits a crime, and a single witness, whose existence and identity is 
unknown to A, makes an incriminating statement to the police.  
Finally, suppose that before the witness is called to testify in court, B 
kills the witness, and that the agreement can be proved 
circumstantially before A is tried. 
In this hypothetical and absent evidence to the contrary, 
defendant A must be said to have at least “acquiesced” in the 
wrongful act of silencing the witness, even though he himself never 
knew the particular witness’s name, or even his existence as a witness.  
This would satisfy the hearsay hurdle set forth in the Federal Rules of 
Evidence.  Evidence of the pre-arrangement proves that the 
defendant had knowledge that the witness was in danger of being 
forcefully silenced, since the defendant could not be prosecuted 
without some witness, even though the defendant did not know the 
name of the witness or his particular testimony.  And, even applying 
 
 199  If she is alive, willing, and able, the prosecution may even call the unavailable 
witness herself, who, although unwilling to testify as to the commission of the 
underlying crime in open court, may be willing to testify at a 104(a) hearing as to 
why she is unavailable and other pertinent information about the defendant’s gang 
activities to which she is privy.  Additionally, if the prosecution has in custody the 
gang members who actually acted to make the declarant unavailable, it might 
consider bargaining with them to testify in exchange for leniency.  This, of course, is 
a difficult decision for a prosecutor, who may not be willing to make a deal with gang 
members who tampered with, intimidated, or even killed a witness. 
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some form of specific intent requirement, there is little doubt that 
sufficiently specific intent to tamper with a witness exists even though 
the defendant did not instruct the friend to kill the witness, or tell the 
friend after the defendant was charged to do anything; it is 
reasonable to infer from evidence of such a pre-arrangement that A 
expects that should he commit a crime, he will benefit from the 
wrongdoing of friend B. 
Similarly, forfeiture by wrongdoing is applicable to a scenario in 
which a gang member-defendant’s associates tamper with witnesses to 
the defendant’s crime.  Suppose the following: X joined a gang and 
subsequently learned that during his tenure as a member, gang 
members repeatedly beat up witnesses to crimes committed by other 
members, causing those witnesses to recant their inculpatory 
statements made to police.  This knowledge reasonably gives rise to 
X’s belief that his fellow gang members would be willing to intimidate 
witnesses on his behalf, if the occasion arose.  Suppose X committed 
armed robbery of a convenience store, murdering the cashier but 
inadvertently leaving unharmed a young boy hidden in the back 
room who saw the entire crime unfold.  Suppose the boy was the only 
eyewitness able to describe the crime and identify X, who was taken 
into custody and charged based solely on the young boy’s statements 
made to authorities in the days following the crime.  Now, suppose 
that, in an overt act of witness tampering, X’s gang associates take it 
upon themselves—without X’s knowledge—to murder the young boy 
before the trial. 
In this gruesome scenario, the prosecution would be left without 
a case—and justice undone—unless an exception to the hearsay rule 
and the Confrontation Clause permitted the admission of the boy’s 
statements in his absence.  The criteria of forfeiture by wrongdoing—
which only need be proved by a preponderance of the evidence—is 
met here: the defendant’s wrongful conduct was to join and remain an 
active member of a gang knowing it enforced a “no snitching” policy 
and expecting to benefit from such enforcement should the occasion 
arise; his continued membership caused his fellow gang members to 
enforce the policy on his behalf; and, of course, he would profit from 
the tampering that he expected the other members of his gang to 
undertake because the only eyewitness to his crime is now dead.  
Even if Giles controls, proof of these elements would surpass what is 
necessary to meet a knowledge-based standard and give rise to an 
inference of intent by a preponderance of the evidence. 
It is possible that an individual defendant specifically intends 
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that his gang associates do not undertake to silence a witness, perhaps 
for moral reasons, to prevent harm to the particular witness, or for 
any other reason.  In that case, forfeiture should not apply, even if 
the gang associates tamper with and successfully silence the witness.  
This Comment proposes a standard that is a sufficient safeguard 
against such inequitable forfeiture.  Evidence giving rise to an 
inference of intent to silence the witness can be countered with 
evidence such as testimony by the defendant or other witnesses that, 
if believed, will render an inference of the requisite intent impossible.  
In this way, the mere fact that the gang unilaterally tampered with or 
killed a witness would not automatically subject the defendant to 
forfeiture; rather, the prosecution must show evidence giving rise to 
an inference of intent to silence witnesses, and the defendant would 
have the opportunity to rebut the evidence if he so chose. 
The standard suggested here puts the defendant at no greater 
disadvantage than other doctrines that operate similarly.  Most 
notably, forfeiture by wrongdoing shares its method of proof with 
conspiracy.200  Like proving forfeiture by wrongdoing, proving that a 
 
 200  The co-conspirator exception to hearsay is an evidentiary rule that treats “a 
statement by a co-conspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of [a] 
conspiracy” as an admission by a party-opponent.  FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E).  
Forfeiture by wrongdoing and the co-conspirator exception to hearsay are 
“analytically and functionally identical.”  United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 
1280 (1st Cir. 1996) (citing United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1180 (1st Cir. 
1993), cert. denied 512 U.S. 1223 (1994)).  They are similar in two ways: procedurally, 
the requirements necessary to invoke forfeiture by wrongdoing and the co-
conspirator exception to hearsay are by and large the same, and substantively, they 
are both doctrines that can involve an inference that a defendant is responsible for 
the actions or words of another person.  Both require a showing of specific intent, 
and, for both, an affirmative finding can rest upon circumstantial evidence.  The 
same degree of evidentiary support that is sufficient to support a conspiracy for the 
purposes of the co-conspirator exception to hearsay is applicable to forfeiture by 
wrongdoing.  These stark similarities suggest that a gang member-defendant who—in 
the terminology of conspiracy—“consciously participated” in an organization with a 
policy of enforcing a “no snitching” policy thereby forfeited his right to cross-
examine any adverse witness silenced by his gang on his behalf. 
To invoke forfeiture by wrongdoing, the proponent must show that the 
declarant is unavailable due to wrongdoing that the defendant procured or to which 
he acquiesced, by, in most circuits, a preponderance of the evidence.  See Cotto v. 
Herbert, 331 F.3d 217, 235 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Zlatogur, 271 F.3d 1025, 1028 
(11th Cir. 2001); United States v. Scott, 284 F.3d 77 F.3d 811, 820 (10th Cir. 2000); see 
also Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1202 (6th Cir. 1982) (applying preponderance 
standard for preliminary findings in forfeiture by misconduct cases).  If testimonial 
statements are in question, the proponent must also show that the defendant 
possessed specific intent to silence the declarant.  The proponent of a co-
conspirator’s statement under FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E) must show that a 
conspiracy existed, the declarant and the defendant were both parties to the 
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defendant is party to a conspiracy requires a showing of specific 
intent.201  Circumstantial evidence can give rise to a defendant’s 
“conscious participation” in a conspiracy, even if the defendant 
merely “had some idea of its criminal objectives” without knowing all 
the details of the crimes involved or the existence of other co-
conspirators.202  Neither knowledge of a conspiracy, nor association 
with conspirators, nor the defendant’s presence at the scene of a 
criminal act can alone constitute sufficient evidence of intent to 
participate in the conspiracy,203 just as neither knowledge of witness 
tampering nor membership in a gang can each alone constitute 
sufficient evidence of intent to silence a witness.  At the same time, a 
person need not expressly agree to participate in a conspiracy to be a 
guilty party to it—actions can imply consent.204  Further, knowledge of 
 
conspiracy, and the declarant made the statement in furtherance of the conspiracy.  
Houlihan, 92 F.3d at 1281.  Like forfeiture by wrongdoing, all this must be shown 
under Rule 104(a) by a preponderance of the evidence.  Bourjaily v. United States, 
483 U.S. 171, 175 (1987). 
For both the co-conspirator exception and forfeiture by wrongdoing, the 
threshold to meet the standard of proof is low, and direct evidence is not required, 
both for practical as well as policy reasons.  In the case of forfeiture of confrontation 
rights: 
 [i]t seems almost certain that, in a case involving coercion or threats, a 
witness who refuses to testify at trial will not testify to the actions 
procuring his or her unavailability.  It would not serve the goal of Rule 
804(b)(6) to hold that circumstantial evidence cannot support a 
finding of coercion.  Were we to hold otherwise, defendants would 
have a perverse incentive to cover up wrongdoing with still more 
wrongdoing, to the loss of probative evidence at trial.   
Scott, 284 F.3d at 764.  
Similarly, the co-conspirator exception to hearsay is supported by both practical 
and equitable rationales.  Conspiracies tend to be clandestine in nature such that 
criminal activity is difficult to prove, often rendering statements by co-conspirators 
crucial evidence for the prosecution.  RONALD J. ALLEN, ET AL, EVIDENCE: TEXT, 
PROBLEMS, AND CASES 484 (4th ed. 2006).  Further, it is appropriate to burden a 
conspirator with the “risk that false or inaccurate co-conspirators’ statements will be 
used against that person” once it has been proven by a preponderance of the 
evidence that he participated in a criminal conspiracy.  See id.  Another rationale is 
that co-conspirators are deemed to have authorized statements made by co-
conspirators, but it is largely an artificial explanation, id., that rests on principles of 
agency, which are not implicated in the forfeiture by wrongdoing analysis.  
 201  Palmer v. People, 964 P.2d 524, 527 (Colo. 1998) (“The crime of conspiracy 
requires two mental states . . . the specific intent to agree to commit a particular 
crime . . . [and] the specific intent to cause the result of the crime that is the subject 
of the agreement.”); Julia N. Sarnoff, Federal Criminal Conspiracy, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
663, 671 (2011). 
 202  Sarnoff, supra note 201, at 671–72. 
 203  Id. 
 204  United States v. Klein, 515 F.2d 751, 753 (3d Cir. 1975) (citing Direct Sales 
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an ongoing conspiracy, while insufficient in itself to constitute intent, 
can nonetheless serve as the basis for an inference of specific intent.205  
(In fact, some courts have gone further, allowing conspiracy to serve 
as an underlying rationale for invocation of forfeiture by wrongdoing, 
even where a defendant was not formally charged with a 
conspiracy.206). 
According to the Giles Court, without the forfeiture rule, there 
would exist “an intolerable incentive for defendants to bribe, 
intimidate, or even kill witnesses against them.”207  This incentive 
applies with particular force where gangs are involved.  While 
procedural safeguards such as permitting depositions and cross-
examination by the defense prior to trial may help safeguard against 
 
Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703, 709 (1943)); United States v. Lester, 282 F.2d 750, 
753 (3d Cir. 1960). 
 205  Direct Sales Co., 319 U.S. at 711 (“Without the knowledge, the intent cannot 
exist.”); Klein, 515 F.2d at 753 (“Knowledge of the illicit purpose will also serve as the 
foundation for the required proof of specific intent.”). 
 206  The Tenth Circuit first addressed the question of whether forfeiture can be 
enacted by the actions of another person. It held in the affirmative, establishing what 
is now known as the Cherry doctrine.  The Cherry doctrine relies on the assertion that 
both the Confrontation Clause and evidence exceptions are met if “the wrongful 
procurement was in furtherance, within the scope, and reasonably foreseeable as a 
necessary or natural consequence of an ongoing conspiracy.”  United States v. 
Cherry, 217 F.3d 811, 820 (10th Cir. 2000).  Since then, some circuits have held that 
“acquiescence” is co-extensive with co-conspirator liability under Pinkerton liability.  
See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1948), for the purposes of forfeiture by 
wrongdoing.  See United States v. Thompson, 286 F.3d 950 (7th Cir. 2002) (adopting 
the Cherry doctrine). 
In Cherry, the court allowed forfeiture by wrongdoing even while admitting that 
there was “absolutely no evidence [the defendant] had actual knowledge of, agreed 
to or participated in the murder of” the declarant.  Cherry 217 F.3d at 814 (quoting 
United States v. Price, No. CR-98-10-S, order at 17 (E.D. Okla. Jan. 14, 1999).  It 
reasoned that the requirements of conspiracy were met because it was reasonably 
foreseeable to the defendant that his co-conspirator might silence the witness in 
furtherance of the conspiracy.  Id. at 820 (holding that a defendant waives his 
hearsay objection and confrontation rights if the wrongful procurement of a 
witness’s silence “was in furtherance, within the scope, and reasonably foreseeable as 
a necessary or natural consequence of an ongoing conspiracy”).  Similar to the 
inference of intent to silence in domestic violence murders, the court in Cherry stated 
that imputed waiver of confrontation rights under the Cherry doctrine may be used to 
admit hearsay even though the defendant is not convicted of the underlying crime.  
This is because the standard for showing forfeiture by wrongdoing is preponderance 
of the evidence, while the standard for conviction of the substantive offense is proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  Moreover, a prosecutor need not even charge a 
defendant with a conspiracy in order to utilize the Cherry doctrine to admit hearsay.  
Adrienne Rose, Note, Forfeiture of Confrontation Rights Post-Giles: Whether a Co-
conspirator’s Misconduct Can Forfeit a Defendant’s Right to Confront Witnesses, 14 N.Y.U. J. 
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 281, 300 (2011). 
 207  Giles v. California, 455 U.S. 353, 365. 
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intimidation by the defendant,208 the threat of witness intimidation by 
other gang members would remain, particularly in cases where entire 
communities are silenced by gang terrorization and control.209  Given 
the high occurrence of witness intimidation by gangs and the broad 
influence of gangs’ “code of silence” over the communities under 
gang control, forfeiture by wrongdoing would lessen the incentive for 
gangs to intimidate witnesses on behalf of a gang member-defendant 
to prevent admission of testimony. 
Just three years after the adoption of the Sixth Amendment, 
courts recognized that the confrontation right was “founded on 
natural justice,”210 notions of which are violated when a gang member-
defendant is granted a windfall resulting from the terror that his 
gang inflicts on adverse witnesses and the community at large.  Where 
a defendant’s associates act independently to prevent witness 
testimony, the defendant may benefit and even escape prosecution 
altogether.211  Where the defendant expects this benefit yet continues 
his gang membership, he should forfeit his right to confrontation.212 
III. CONCLUSION 
The problem of witness intimidation by street and prison gangs 
is a serious impediment to justice, not only because it can undermine 
the prosecution of crime but also because it fosters a dynamic of fear 
and isolation in gang-controlled communities.  Gangs have an 
incentive to silence witnesses because, unless the prosecution can 
 
 208  See D. Michael Risinger & Lesley C. Risinger, Innocence Is Different: Taking 
Innocence Into Account in Reforming Criminal Procedure, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 869, 907 
(2012) (arguing that a defendant’s motive to intimidate would be reduced by a 
procedure allowing for deposition of prosecution witnesses followed by a reasonable 
opportunity for cross-examination by the defense, “coupled with the understanding 
that if anything happens to the witness before trial that results in unavailability or 
substantial change in position, the deposition will be available for use by the jury”).  
In fact, Marian statutes “directed justices of the peace to take the statements of felony 
suspects and the persons bringing the suspects before the magistrate, and to certify 
those statements to the court,” and these “confronted statements” were admissible 
even if the declarant died or was unable to travel to court.  Giles, 544 U.S. at 359 
(citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43–44; J. Langbein, Prosecuting Crime in 
the Renaissance 10–12, 16–20 (1974)). 
 209  See, e.g., Kocieniewski, supra note 10; Witnesses at Risk, supra note 10. 
 210  E.g., State v. Webb, 2. N.C. (1 Hayw.) 103 (1794). 
 211  See, e.g., Witnesses at Risk, supra note 10 (describing examples of gang crimes 
that remain unsolved or unprosecuted because witnesses are scared to testify). 
 212  “[T]he rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing . . . extinguishes confrontation claims 
on essentially equitable grounds.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62; see also Reynolds v. United 
States, 98 U.S. 145, 158 (1879); PARK, supra note 134. 
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trace the conduct back to the defendant, statements by the 
unavailable witness are generally inadmissible at trial.  To combat 
gang-perpetrated intimidation, legislatures should ensure forfeiture 
by wrongdoing is a hearsay exception in each jurisdiction.  
Prosecutors should, where gangs successfully make declarants 
unavailable, utilize the forfeiture doctrine by providing evidence that 
a gang member-defendant both had knowledge of his gang “no 
snitching” policy and had a reasonable expectation of profiting from 
enforcement.  Finally, courts should, where the evidence sufficiently 
satisfies the preponderance standard, treat such defendants as if they 
specifically intended the witness to be made unavailable.  This would 
preserve the right to confrontation—and its exceptions—as it existed 
at common law and as it endures as a constitutional safeguard; 
moreover, it would meet the Giles standard insofar as it might apply.  
Witness intimidation “strikes at the heart of justice,”213 but courts and 
legislatures have it within their power to strike back at the gangs that 
terrorize their communities.  By maximizing the effect of the 
doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing, the incentive to intimidate 
witnesses will diminish, and the statements of witnesses made silent by 
gangs will nonetheless be heard in a court of law. 
 
 
 213  United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 1982). 
